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Symposium Review: Galbraith's "Concept
of Countervailing Power" and
Lilienthal's "Big Business"t
Edwin G. Nourse*

IN these two books we find two doughty knights of the pen entering

the lists of economic controversy. The scope of their argument
and the weapons and tactics they use are marked by differences no
less striking than is the fact that nonetheless they are joined in a
common cause-the justification of bigness.
David Lilienthal is a lawyer turned executive of a public enterprise and now returned to legal practice and business consulting.
Kenneth Galbraith is an economist who served a tour of duty as a
bureaucrat in Washington and is now returned to academic halls.
Both are journalists, the former a professional, who served some
years on the staff of Fortune, and the latter a "semi-pro," who
first published much of the content of this book as a series of articles in Collier's. Hence both books are readably different from the
ordinary treatise. Professor Galbraith, however, assures the reader
that he could have written in the incomprehensible idiom of the
professional economist had he so desired. His book may properly
be regarded as an economic brief for the defense in the case of
The Public Interest v. Power Groups whereas Lilienthal's book
might be filed as an economic brief for the plaintiff in the case of
Big Business v. Current Interpretation of Antitrust.
The latter admits that he grew up in the small-town, smallbusiness prejudice against Big Business. Become lawyer, he revered the Sherman and Clayton Acts as protectors of free enterprise
and the public against big business domination. But two years on
the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, thirteen years as a
tAmEPICAN CAPITALISm: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING PoWER. By John
Kenneth Galbraith. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1952. Pp. 217. $3.00
BIG BusINEss: A NEWv ERA. By David E. Lilienthal. New York: Harper and
Brothers. 1953. Pp. 209. $2.75.
*Director, Institute of Economics of the Brookings Institution, 1929-42; Vice
President, Brookings Institution, 1942-46; Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors,
Executive Office of the President 1946-49.
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director of TVA, and three years as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, he testifies, struck the scales from his eyes. He
came to see bigness in corporate and in governmental organization
as essential to the achievement of the technological, the economic,
and even the social possibilities of modern life. Now retired from
the active executive role to the analytical and advisory role, he
feels he can take a "relaxed look at this controversial issue." Some
may think they see traces of the convert's zeal.
Far from being a mere apologetic defender of Big Business, Mr.
Lilienthal is its militant protagonist. He not only capitalizes Big
Business through the book; he apotheosizes it as "a proud and
fruitful achievement of the American people as a whole. . .a
social institution that promotes human freedom and individualism.
• . .Big Business is basic to the very life of the country; and yet
many-perhaps most-Americans have a deep-seated fear and emotional repugnance to it. Here is a monumental contradiction."
Mr. Lilienthal gives considerable detail as to how Big Business
promotes these ends in thirteen chapters on the fine "fruits of
bigness" in "the new competition." The argument focuses around
two points: (1) that possibilities of monopolistic pressure on the
buying public are sharply limited under modern technology and
(2) that there is real price competition between large industrial
and commercial corporations under present conditions of professional management. 1
The present reviewer can hardly fail to be in basic agreement
with both these views since, fifteen years ago, he took essentially
the same positions, though in terms somewhat more restrained. I
concluded:
"To point to the mere size of modern corporations, functioning
as they do today, as an evidence 'that the era of competitive
capitalism has been brought to a close' is a conclusion not supported by the evidence. Insofar as large-scale organization puts
the natural pacemaker in a position of command within a large
segment of the economy, it means a struggle to advance the
lines of economic effort of truly heroic proportions. The competition among pigmies, which some are eager to try to restore,
is puny by comparison. Competition is quite as keen and much
more productive of results when we find industrial giants
marshaling their mighty resources to perfect techniques and
new schemes of organization through whose use more and
'2
better goods may be put within the reach of the masses."
1. Moreover, "one of the attractive aspects of modem Big Business is that it
creates opportunities previously non-existent for a multitude of small business
enterprises, and broadens the area wherein smaller businesses can find opportunities
that are neither profitable nor suitable for the big" (p. x).

2.
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Mr. Lilienthal argues not only that this kind of large-unit competition may be active and beneficial but that it in fact is so. He
advances three reasons: (1) A growing intention to serve the
consumer and the workers springs from internal changes:
"A new kind of 'top boss' of large business undertakings is a
man with a strong and practical sense of responsibility to the
public, and an awareness of the ethics of present-day business
competition . . . trained as professional men in the now numerous and seasoned graduate schools of business administration . . . [or] come to management posts with a background of technical training and experience, as chemists,
chemical engineers, physicists, mechanical, or civil engineers.
These men represent graphically, in their persons and in
their outlook and function, the coming of age of Big Business"
(p. 27).
Competition in services to the public is forced upon astute
(2)
management by the constraining force of consumer choice or of
public opinion in a more abstract sense.
"This is by no means true only of buyers of huge quantities,
such as chain stores or automobile companies.... Not only are
a big company's prices thus the subject of public challenge and
criticism if not actual fixing. . . . The same is true of the
quality of its products; its labor relations, the effect of its policies on broad issues such as inflation or our relations with Latin
America; the change in public accountability on the part of
industrial management is a reflection of the effectiveness of
the new checks and balances upon abuses of economic power"
(pp. 29-31).
(3)

There is the ameliorating influence of labor unions.

"The most significant change [in the changed America of Big
Business] is in a modification of the power of employers to fix
[These] are now
the terms and conditions of employment ....
matters of negotiation and agreement with labor's representa-

tives" (p. 20).
In all this Lilienthal marches in step with Galbraith (whose book
he had evidently read since he, at one or two points, uses the phrases
"countervailing power").3 But, of course, the facts had been a matter of common knowledge in business circles and economic writings
for some time. Lilienthal recognizes that there are still shortcomings in the behavior of big business. But his discussion of "the
Hazards of Bigness" (Part IV) gives a growing impression that
3. He seems also to take much the same view as Galbraith as to the countervailing role of the state. "It is government's changed and expanded role in economic
affairs, notably since 1933, that in my opinion reduces to quite manageable proportions the danger of abuses by Big Business; thus armed we can now safely
promote and encourage Bigness rather than view its growth with apprehension."
LILaNTHAL, BIG BusINESS: A NEW ERA XI (1952).
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these were hazards of the bad old early days of big business dereliction that have largely been eliminated by the enlightenment of
executive leadership today. It is not that bigness as such has defects, but that some men frustrate the innate beneficence of bigness.
Applying his analysis of bigness to the antitrust issue, Lilienthal
argues that experience under the actual developments of technology
and enlightened management gives adequate evidence that the
framers of the Sherman Act were wrong in supposing that monopolistic power and its abuse were inherent in the newly emerged
"trusts" or consolidated companies. The evils which promoted the
passage of the Act are neither inherent in the big business organization as a structure nor inevitable in the behavior of its human
agents. But the trend of recent court decisions has, in his view,
ignored the lessons of this experience (as has also much of the
administrative work of various federal regulatory bodies) and thus
threatens to justify the comment of Justice Holmes that "the Sherman Act is a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence."
Mr. Lilienthal sees dire consequences flowing from the recru-,
descence of the doctrine that size should be construed as illegal per
se. He sees them as really crippling restraints.
"The legal antagonism to size as such causes a profligate waste
and distraction of the energies of management and technical
talent of business. It substitutes, in business councils, the
supercaution, not to say timidity, of the lawyer for the enterprise and boldness of a business manager and technical expert.
It bogs down the Federal courts with endless and unmanageable litigation to the detriment of all other litigants. Because
much of our public policy toward Big Business and its expression in interminable antitrust lawsuits and Congressional investigations is so obviously fruitless and barren, it thereby
undermines respect for government among conscientious citizens" (p. 5).
This claim that if this single handicap were removed, Big Business would promptly achieve a new day of abundance and economic
progress overstates Mr. Lilienthal's case. Admitting that much
of the antitrust crusade is burdensome and ill-conceived, his own
first chapters document the fact that, even with this handicap, we
are making amazing technological progress, achieving a high level
of managerial efficiency, and attaining greater dignity and peace in
business relations. The cumbrous car of social progress is held
back by economic stupidity in the ranks and cupidity among the
leaders much more than by the Sherman Act or its misinterpretation "based largely upon prejudice created by abuses long since corrected, upon an antiquarian's portrait of another America, not the
America of the mid-twentieth century" (p. 5).
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As to Government policy in the face of this state of facts, as
Lilienthal interprets them, he would let the Sherman Act and Clayton Amendment stand as they are, rely mainly on the competition
among large-scale units supplemented by the counteraction of labor,
consumer groups, and public opinion to protect the public interest.
Beyond this,
"the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and the
members and staff of the Federal Trade Commission constitute
a kind of F. B. I. of the world of business competition, with a
responsibility to detect and to protect the public against acts of
coercion, deceit, boycott, collusion or forms of business violence
that inflict injury on competitors and the consuming public.
The enforcing officers should concentrate on these specific
policing functions, which should be maintained and even
strengthened in their administration" (pp. 169, 170).
To make national policy clear and not subject to the personal
views of particular administrators or courts, Lilienthal proposes a
Basic Economic Act. Whereas "the Sherman Act forbids 'restraint
of trade'-a double negative, the new law, by contrast, should expressly foster the development of trade-a double affirmative"
(p. 185).
Here the reviewer finds himself beset by doubts. How can a federal statute promote the development of private economic activity
and service to the public? Lilienthal has argued mightily that that
invaluable quality is inherent in modern business and its leaders;
what is needed is that it be not crippled. He himself cannily
refrains from specific suggestions as to the content of the new law's
policy declaration, saying merely, "it would be necessary in such a
law that there be spelled out, in legal terms, well-defined criteria
by which to judge whether Bigness furthers or injures the public
interest, criteria of the sort I have herein suggested only in laymen's language (p. 186). Under the new law, "the legal test Bigness would have to face would thenceforth be whether the particular aspect of size challenged by the government does in fact
further the public interest" (p. 187). That is a large order indeed!
I doubt that practical business executives would be eager to jump
from the present frying pan into that lethal fire.
It would be obviously impossible for a statute to lay down in precise and comprehensive terms a scheme for measuring the quantitative or even the qualitative impact of a big company's actions on
"the overall public interest." Would it not be sufficient, according
to Lilienthal's own objectives, to have the law limit its "basic economic policy, by which courts, executive agencies, and Congressional committees would all be guided" (p. 185), to two points:
(1) that mere size was not to be construed as in violation of anti-
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trust laws because of its potential use to limit competition or harm
the public interest (any more than we arrest a citizen because he is
so strong as to have the power to commit mayhem or murder or so
poor as to be under great temptation to steal) ; (2) that, in judging
the admissibility of practices of large companies, courts and administrative officers shall "consider ... all the surrounding facts and
circumstances . . . a doctrine advanced by some of our greatest
judges, notably Hughes, Brandeis, Holmes and Roberts. It would
once more give vitality to the now almost moribund 'rule of reason'
''4
in construing (antitrust) laws.
This reviewer does not see how criteria of beneficence can be
written into a statute. He does agree with Lilienthal that it is highly
important for Congress to declare itself against that interpretation
of Sherman and Clayton that says that the power of bigness "should
not exist ... Industrial power should be decentralized. It should
be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people
will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact
that they are not vicious men but respectable and social-minded is
irrelevant. That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman
Act" (p. 173) .5 It is high time that this issue be clarified.
Galbraith's approach to the general problem is on the whole even
more optimistic than Lilienthal's. While in theory the growth of
power aggregations should have made our economy bog down, we
are in fact achieving a "tolerable" result. Though he uses this
word repeatedly, he really goes somewhat further in his optimism.
"The favorable performance of the American economy in the years
following World War II is a fact. [With minor exceptions], there
was little hardship. . . The ideas which caused the present to be
viewed with such uncertainty and the future with such alarm were
not operative. . . . The present organization and management of
the American economy . . . works, and in the years since World
War II, quite brilliantly" (p. 2). It is only an illusion of economic
insecurity that besets us and that he attempts to dispel under the
sardonic chapter title "The Insecurity of Illusion."
4. Here it may be useful to recall the Capper-Volstead Act. It was based on
the fact that the Clayton Amendment merely protected cooperative associations
from being dealt with as ipso facto violators of the Sherman Act, leaving the issue
of practices in restraint of trade (and presumably size under present Supreme Court
rulings) to the Department of Justice and state courts. However, it gave the Secretary of Agriculture the special power of acting as a tribunal to protect the public
and gave him as a criterion "undue enhancement of prices" by co-ops. His finding
on the point was to be prima facie evidence in any court where a co-operative association is sued for infraction of the antitrust laws. Could Mr. Lilienthal's Basic
Economic Act, aside from its definitions of collusive or coercive acts, prescribe
criteria any less tenuous than "undue enhancement of prices?"
5. Quoting from Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1947).
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Galbraith does not direct his analysis specifically or merely at the
big corporation as does Lilienthal (though even he makes some excursions into the realm of big unions and big government operations). Galbraith is concerned rather (but reassuringly so) with
great interest groupings-business, labor, agriculture, government.
For him, alarms about concentrations of economic power are unjustified. The disease engenders its own antibodies, and Nature
cures all things. Some malaise, some lost time, some incidental
expense, of course, but neither death nor permanent injury to the
body economic.
Galbraith pays less detailed attention than Lilienthal to technology as a means of providing substitutes and thus preventing
pressure of the strong producer on the weak consumer, but rates
"the modern industry of a few large firms as an almost perfect instrument for inducing technological change" (p. 91). He gives
much more attention to the growth of countervailing power of consumers when Sears Roebuck or the Giant Market becomes their
purchasing agent or of other big producers when they themselves
become the sole or dominant buyers of their suppliers' product.
It is not a little surprising to find him referring to this development as ignored by economists (pp. 118, 141) in view of the fact
that for years back it has been extensively treated in discussions
of imperfect competition and has even led to the general use of the
term monopsony to describe concentrations of buyers' power vis-avis monopoly (or oligopoly) as concentrations of sellers' power.
Galbraith, after saying that economists have failed to see that
industrial power has concentrated in the hands of strong buyers
as well as sellers recognizes its place in the literature and dismisses
it (p. 120) as "the terminology of bilateral monopoly power." The
point of his rejection is that "in the economic literature, it is treated
as an adventitious occurrence," whereas he stresses its "selfgenerating" aspect. It would not be hard to document the proposition that in fact it has often been discussed as counter-organization of market power. And as to its self-generating quality, he
himself points out that absence of imaginative leadership, a sturdily
cohesive membership, or the will to use power weapons may negate
the self-generating principle, leaving a power vacuum that government must step in and fill.
Other countervailing pairs in Galbraith's sketch are farmers and
processors (also chain stores and cooperative groups), management
and the labor union.6 "The operation of countervailing power is to
be seen with the greatest clarity in the labor market, where it is also
6. He also includes, casually, such unpaired items as unemployment insurance,
SEC, minimum wage provisions, and "soft money."
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most fully developed" (p. 121). This presents the familiar picture
of workers organizing for collective bargaining on a wider and
wider scale as corporate power has grown. It presents also the
persistent problem of securing "equality of bargaining power"
under the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, the real meaning
and Congressional intent in Section 6 of the Clayton Act, and recurrent proposals to put labor organizations under the antitrust
laws. Clearly Galbraith would not go along with that proposal,
though his complacency about the efficiency of countervailing power
would presumably not go so far as to align him with John L. Lewis
in advocating repeal of all labor laws. He might expect that the
two parties would battle mightily to produce a workable compromise. He shows no fear that frequent or prolonged deadlocks
between them might lead to seriously reduced employment and
production.
Faced with this disturbing suggestion, he would no doubt argue
that we have been meeting this sort of challenge "in the years since
World War II quite brilliantly"-witness the employment figures
and the production index. But success in the presence of inflation
as an escape clause is not conclusive as to what may eventuate in
times of disinflation or price stability. Other economists have had
less complacency than Galbraith that a balance of power will assure
both peace and progress rather than stalemate and lowered productivity. In such a contingency, Galbraith would no doubt produce his sovereign remedy-the intervention of the state. Of that,
more later.
Agriculture presents "the effort of longest standing to develop
countervailing power." To some extent, farmers sought to redress
a situation of disadvantage by curbing the power of those to whom
they sold or from whom they bought. They were a major force in
securing the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman
Act, and other "Granger laws." Galbraith argues that agrarian
support of soft money was a second drive for countervailing power
but that both have now declined in importance, whereas the growth
of cooperative associations built market power against both the
buyers of farm products and the sellers of farm supplies. When the
structural weakness of even "national" cooperatives proved inadequate to countervail against the forces (or weakness) of domestic
and foreign markets, the Federal Government was brought in (1929
and 1933) to administer carryovers and control or at least guide
the future flow of supply.
Here we come to the top stratum of Galbraith's model of countervailing power. He does not really think that General Motors, Ford,
and Chrysler will countervail perfectly against each other in the
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car market; that Sears Roebuck, Standard Oil, and other mass distributors, will precisely countervail against the Big Five in the tire
market; that labor unions will just countervail against manufacturers, merchants, and farmers to give us a satisfactory pattern of
private capitalism. In his model, the Government plays the ultimate and crucial role. He would assign to Government itself the
role of becoming the countervailing power against any "original"
7
power that arises in the economy.
"It is incumbent upon government to give [countervailing
power] freedom to develop and to determine how it may best
do so. The government also faces the question of where or how
it will affirmatively support the development of countervailing
power.... Both farmers and workers have sought and received
government assistance either in the form of direct support of
their market power or in support to organization which in turn
made market power possible. In short, the government has
subsidized with its own power the countervailing power of
workers and farmers .... This assistance, clearly, explains
some part of the self-confidence and well-being which these
groups display today.... What has strengthened the American
economy so admirably in the past must be presumed to have an
unexploited potential for good in the future. . . . We cannot
assume that efforts by presently unorganized groups to seek
market power and to seek the assistance of government in their
effort, is finished business" (pp. 143, 152, 153, 154).
On the issue of antitrust law and judicial interpretation as such,
Professor Galbraith has relatively little to say. Antitrust law has
become an inadequate weapon because monopolistic powers are
"ubiquitous" and "it is evidently not so practical to indict a whole
economy" (p. 55). He would clearly not attack size or market
power as such, but would have courts and administrative agencies
address their attention primarily to the question of the end to
which market power was being exercised, and how. "The mere
possession and exercise of market power is not a useful criterion
for antitrust action.. . . Against whom and for what purpose is
the power being exercised? Unless this question is asked and the
answer makes clear that the public is the victim, the antitrust laws,
by attacking countervailing power, can as well enhance as reduce
monopoly power" (p. 149). In the A.&P. cases, the "government
was in the highly equivocal position of prosecuting activities which
have the effect of keeping down prices to the consumer. The
7. This concept of monopoloids as wielding "original market power" needs
examination from the economic side. Is it not in fact an outgrowth of the powers
of corporate organization, tariff protection, patents, or franchise given by the
state to such a group to enable it to countervail against the still prior power of
foreign producers or domestic buyers? Just how could market power be independent
of or antecedent to an institutional structure?
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position of market power which had given A.&P. its opportunity
were left untouched. (p. 148) . . . Serious damage can be done to

the economy by such legislation as the Robinson-Patman Act ...
legislation that strikes directly at the effective exercise of countervailing power" (p. 149).
It is evident that there is much common ground in the thinking
of Galbraith and Lilienthal. Neither would attack mere size or
latent power. Both urge that courts and administrators should require adequate evidence as to the impact of given practices on the
consuming public and on the productivity of the economy and
should not be concerned to protect any and every competitor against
the greater efficiency or higher standards of service which a rival
was able to attain and willing to put into practice. Galbraith does
not argue that "an exemption of countervailing power should now
be written into the antitrust laws," but he quite conceivably would
welcome a Basic Economic Act such as Lilienthal suggests which
would clarify national policy negatively by declaring that size or
potential power shall not be the test of legality and affirmatively
setting forth general criteria of operational efficiency, technological
progress, and public benefit for the guidance of courts and administrative officials.
In spite of these areas of agreement, however, there is fundamental divergence in the views of the two authors. Whereas Liberal Lilienthal would turn business loose to achieve the full fruition
of its powers and reserve to the Federal Government only the power
to police abusive practices, New Dealer Galbraith would put the
Federal Government in the position of ultimate power and responsibility to make the economy work, redressing the weakness of
group position or the faults of group bargains and production and
marketing adjustments. Only this would, in Galbraith's judgment,
bring about performance commensurate with the potentialities of
our resources.

The later chapters of American Capitalism dispel the impression
conveyed in earlier chapters that the concept of countervailing
power amounts to a modernized version of the Unseen Hand, which
would permit group competition to accomplish in an advanced industrial society the benign adjustments of the market which in a
simple society could be achieved through atomistic competition.
Instead of looking backward toward automaticity, Galbraith seems
to be pointing forward to an economy of central economic planning.
"In the past, private business management has had decisive
responsibilities in the economy. (p. 171) . . . Like competi-

tion, countervailing power operates to prevent the misuse of

such power. (p. 172) . . . Since the development of counter-

vailing power is irregular and incomplete, it does not provide
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a blanket case for the exclusion of state interference with private decision. Moreover, the state must be expected to participate in the development of countervailing power. (p. 173) . . .
No case for an ideal distribution and employment of resources
-for maximized social efficiency-can be made when countervailing power rather than competition is accepted as the basic
regulator of the economy. (p. 175) . . .It cannot be argued

that the undisturbed judgment of the industry in these cases
(steel, housing, automobiles) is necessarily the best one; the
social judgment reflected in the attitudes of government, may
well be theoretically better. (p. 176)-.

.

. The objective of

social control over production decisions is to make the resulting decisions more responsive to social needs and desires.
(p. 177) . . . Public ownership of these industries (coal min-

ing, transport, electricity, gas utilities, overseas communications, and banking) is commonplace in advanced industrial
countries." (p. 179) 8

In closing, I must admit to considerable bafflement as to one phase
of Galbraith's argument, which apparently is basic to his thinking
-the issue of inflation. Generalizing that "the support of countervailing power has become in the last two decades perhaps the major
peacetime function of the Federal Government," Galbraith lists a
string of labor, agrarian, and other reform measures as "among the
most important legislative acts of the New Deal, all designed to
give a group a marketing power it did not have before." He cites
the "brilliant performance [of] the period since World War II" as
demonstration that, through countervailing power, we have found
the solution to the problem of making modern capitalism succeed.
This gives rise to the question: Has a growth of countervailing
power been the cause of such a better functional adjustment among
the several parts of our economic system as would put our current
prosperity on an enduring basis? Or did the brisk activity and
high incomes of this period stem largely from other and perhaps
temporary sources? If recent levels of prosperity should not continue through the years just ahead, would his case for the efficacy
of countervailing power still stand up?
And even as for these years, is there not inconsistency in his
argument that the post World War II period of prosperity has
been due to measures based on the concept of countervailing power
when he himself insists sharply and repeatedly that the beneficent
mechanics of countervailing power are inoperative in periods of
inflationary pressure? Were not these last two decades notable for
the persistence of inflationary pressure? And in the Government
policies which he so applauds, do we not find these groups granted
8. I trust and believe that, in stringing together these brief quotations, I have
not wrenched the thought out of the context but rather have brought to sharp
focus the essential elements of Galbraith's position.
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not merely a "subsidy of power" from the Government but many of
them also a subsidy from the Government purse, with inherently
inflationary impacts?
Edward H. Levi*
Both of these books are exceptionally well written.
Mr. Lilienthal believes that Americans have a deep-seated fear
and an emotional repugnance of bigness. He refers to Mr. Justice
Douglas' dissent in the Columbia Steell case as a classic current exposition of a frankly emotional antagonism. He believes that a
chief reason for the continuation of this repugnance is that "we
think negatively." If we would cease to think negatively then many
big jobs could be done with the aid of bigness. The problem of bigness in this country has changed, he feels, with the acceptance of
social responsibility by the large companies, the new role of governmental participation in economic and previously private affairs,
the power and influence of organized labor and a change in the
power of large buyers. Competition has changed also, for integration has brought us competition within firms, and anyway competition for practical purposes should be regarded as rivalry, which
arises among large firms and does not require the existence of many
small units. But the old attitude or perhaps an erroneous new attitude against bigness persists in the administration of the antitrust laws. We should return to a yardstick which would make
relevant all the surrounding circumstances-"a doctrine advanced
by some of our greatest judges, notably Hughes, Brandeis, Holmes
and Roberts." Indeed, we should have legislation which will make
us focus on a double affirmative; namely whether the laws as enforced will expressly foster the development of trade. We will be
concerned then with productivity and the promotion of an ethical
and economic distribution of this productivity. Apparently the application of the new law to a big enterprise might take into account
the company's contribution to national defense, its labor relations,
pension funds and welfare plans, the reasonableness of its prices,
the adequacy of its services and its technological advances. In this
new light bigness will be able to further spiritual values and we will
lose that false snobbishness which has made us lose faith.
Mr. Galbraith tells us his book is not in the tradition of the great
polemic. It is a good humored book and it concludes with an appeal
for good will. He remarks that "pessimism in our time is infinitely
more respectable than optimism." Mr. Galbraith notes a feeling of
apprehension and insecurity in our society, although "in the face
*Dean, University of Chicago Law School.
1. United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495, 534-40 (1947).
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of success." The feeling of insecurity, although subject to discount
even by businessmen themselves, arises from a belief that our
economy is either headed for state socialism or a depression or both.
Perhaps governmental intervention has risen to the theoretical
point where the "conservative ... would already be dispossessed."
On the economic concentration side, "economic power belonging to
the genus monopoly is commonplace in the economy," and in theory
"we should all be suffering under the exploitation and struggling to
pay for the inefficiency of monopoly." In fact, our present economy
"is working brilliantly." Mr. Galbraith's book concerns the reconciliation of theory with fact.
The reconciliation is not accomplished by minimizing the substantial amount of economic concentration often said to exist in our
society. Mr. Galbraith's conclusions on this score are that a small
number of larger corporations are responsible for a very substantial
proportion of all industrial activity, that "entry into an industry is
easy only when it is new," and that the replacement of the old and
senile by the young and vigorous is a far fetched fiction. Moreover,
under oligopoly conditions, there is a convention against price competition in order to avoid self destruction, and competition takes a
form "no longer eligible for a blanket defense"-rhymed commercials, soap operas and bill boards. Mr. Galbraith achieves his reconciliation of fact and theory, first, by advancing the notion that
"modern industry of a few large firms is an almost perfect instrument for inducing technical change." The resources and the power
of the firms make research and technological development possible
and prevent the gains from being passed on to imitators. "In this
way, market power protects the incentive to technological development." The theory is that "there must be some element of monopoly
in an industry, if it is to be progressive." The "slight continuing
loss of efficiency, as compared with ideal performance, resulting
from the possession of market power is regularly offset and more
by large gains from technological development."
In addition to the theory of monopoly as the instrument of technological change, Mr. Galbraith has the theory of countervailing
power. The theory is that the monopoly power of the seller is reduced not by the existence of competition, but from the check of
economic power in the hands of strong buyers. The strong buyer
is apt to be deeply concerned with volume of sales. This leads him
to exercise his power against any attempt by his supplier to raise
prices. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company "has used
the countervailing power it has developed with considerable artistry." So also, "for many years the power of the automobile com-
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panies, as purchasers of steel, has sharply curbed the power of the
steel mill as sellers."
Failure to understand the role of countervailing power has resulted in the indiscriminate use of the antitrust laws against firms
that have succeeded in building countervailing power, "while holders of original market power, against whom the countervailing
power was developed, have gone unchallenged." Despite this lack of
perception by the Government on the antitrust side, "the support
of countervailing power has become in the last two decades perhaps
the major peacetime function of the Federal Government. Labor
has sought and received it in the protection and assistance which
the Wagner Act provided to union organization. Farmers sought
and received it in the form of federal price support to their
markets ... Unorganized workers have sought and received it in
the form of minimum wage legislation.. ." The beneficial influence
of countervailing power is limited, however, by inflationary pressures on the market, for where there is an excess of demand, the
best hope of the buyer "may be to form a coalition with the seller
to bring about an agreed division of returns."
Both Mr. Lilienthal and Mr. Galbraith, therefore, share a faith
in the importance of large scale enterprise for inducing technological change. Perhaps the most striking example given by
Mr. Lilienthal for his position is the crucial role played by American
Telephone and Telegraph, with its combination of operating and
research units, in the development of atomic energy. Mr. Lilienthal's position does not seem to depend on any monopoly power
residing in the large units. On the contrary, the impression one
gets is that Mr. Lilienthal's life among the large has convinced
him that competition is much more pervasive than he thought.
Mr. Galbraith's point is a little different. At least at the stage
of his argument concerning the importance of large scale for
technological change, he leans heavily on monopoly power. It is
the difficulty potential competitors have in gaining access to the
industry which, in Mr. Galbraith's view, protects the large scale
enterprise and makes invention and new developments pay. Mr.
Lilienthal is disapproving of those who find monopoly where he
sees competition; at this point Mr. Galbraith sees monopoly power
and discovers that it has advantages.
It is difficult to know how much emphasis Mr. Galbraith intends
to give to his position that size carries with it the advantage for
the community of individual monopoly power. The contention that
countervailing power acts as a substitute for competition in reducing the effects of monopoly power seems to clash with the contention that it is the actual exercise of monopoly power (pre-
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sumably not checked by countervailing power), which has made
for technological change. But perhaps the appropriate conclusion
is that countervailing power, while it reduces the effects of monopoly, nevertheless permits enough monopoly consequences to
remain to induce invention and development. Countervailing
power is thus a force which operates as a substitute for the competition which might come from the addition of another competitor
in the market. Indeed there is some reason to believe that a good
deal of what ir. Galbraith calls countervailing power could be
regarded as the potential competition of another firm. The threat
of a buyer to go into production for itself is, after all, the threat
of a potential competitor, and it requires no new analysis to show
that this might reduce monopoly power. There is, however, no
objection to labelling this threat as countervailing power, or in
speaking of it as one of the advantages of integration.
It appears, however, that Mr. Galbraith, while he is extremely
careful in the claims he makes for his theory, sees in countervailing power something more than merely potential competition.
The theory appears to be that buyers will use their power defensively to beat down the prices which otherwise would be charged
by monopoly sellers, and that the benefits of this process are
passed on to consumers. If this is the theory, then the possessor
of countervailing power must stand between the consumer and
the original monopolist. Thus it is not clear how the theory is to
operate when the countervailing power is regarded as possessed
by labor unions or by farmers, to mention two examples given by
Galbraith, unless indeed the theory is that laborers and farmers
are to be regarded as the consumers for this purpose, or that
there may be both good and bad countervailing power. Moreover,
it is not clear why under the theory, the defensive possessors of
monopoly power, that is those having countervailing power, should
pass on to consumers the fruits of their victories. Mr. Galbraith
himself suggests that in times of excess demand the two monopolists, that is the original and the countervailing, may divide the
spoils. It is not clear why such a division might not occur even
in the absence of excess demand. The answer may be that countervailing power is not really monopoly power. If so, it is not clear
what it is, unless perhaps it is the threat of a potential competitor.
Mr. Lilienthal states that his book is not about the antitrust
laws; nevertheless, it is something of an attack on what Mr.
Lilienthal conceives to have been or might be the administration of
the law. Mr. Galbraith voices his concern over a failure in antitrust administration to give sufficient consideration to whether the
power attacked is countervailing. Both Mr. Lilienthal and Mr.
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Galbraith presumably would enlarge the scope of matters to be
considered in an antitrust prosecution. Mr. Lilienthal's list of
items might be the larger, since it includes proof as to wage
policies and pension funds, whereas Mr. Galbraith would rely
apparently on an analysis of whether the power has been well
used against another monopolist. This is to suggest that the antitrust laws should be primarily instruments of Government regulation of business, with emphasis, I should judge, on the word
"regulation." This is the kind of thing that passes for the rule
of reason, which in such a context and with good authority could
be called the sea of doubt. The underlying thought may be that
a consideration of these additional matters will diminish Government prosecutions. If this is the object, however, one may wonder
whether a more appropriate formula could not be devised than
one which rests on a scrutiny of price policies or on whether the
power is used offensively or defensively. One may wonder whether
the defects of the Sherman Act are such as to require making it
more like the Robinson-Patman Act on the one hand, or traditional
cartel regulation on the other, in order to improve it.
Basic questions are raised by these two volumes. One question
concerns the relationship between technological change and monopoly power. Mr. Galbraith assumes a relationship and he may
be right, but he does not prove it. Another question concerns the
relationship between size and monopoly power and the very legitimacy of the ideas of monopoly and competition themselves. Mr.
Lilienthal's argument that size is not to be condemned, quite apart
from whether one agrees with him, takes on quite different meanings, dependent on whether or not monopoly is still regarded as a
useful concept. If competition is rivalry and exists within a firm,
perhaps it may exist where there is only one firm. Perhaps then
competition is monopoly. If monopoly induces technological change
and the corrective for monopoly is more monopoly, one may well
ask what is the advantage of competition. The Lilienthal and
Galbraith books tend to push us in the direction of an analysis of
good and bad monopolies, or perhaps to say the same thing, good
and bad competition. No doubt such a thought has always had
something to do with the administration of the antitrust laws,
but this would be a major change in emphasis. It would weaken
the role of the antitrust laws as a symbol of that kind of Government action which permits competition to regulate and denies
a more active role to Government. A third question implicit in
both books relates to the appropriate role of Government. The new
kind of antitrust proceeding would assign to the Government, at
least through the courts, a much greater discretion in dealing with
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business enterprise-a freedom to interfere as much as to refrain,
resulting in a larger participation by Government in economic
affairs as a whole, either as co-partner or as the creator of countervailing power. The idea that the Government should change the
rules for competition dependent upon whether an individual firm
shows social responsibility seems somehow abhorrent to the theory
of free enterprise. A part of the difficulty is the lack of content in
the phrase social responsibility. It seems to imply conduct contrary to the firm's best interests, and if it doesn't, it is difficult
to know what the phrase adds, other than a gloss on the idea of
individual responsibility, which should be assumed.
Despite what many have written on the subject, including myself, I do not know whether it should be said that there is a great
deal of economic concentration in this country, and recent studies
cast great doubt on the once prevalent notion that concentration
has been increasing. Mr. Lilienthal must know that the note
which his book strikes about the new competition and the changed
conditions which have made size so important is an old note indeed.
Perhaps Mr. Galbraith would agree also that in general the conditions of concentration with which the Sherman Act has to deal
today are not so different than they once were. I am not sure,
therefore, why either Mr. Lilienthal or Mr. Galbraith believes a
change in antitrust enforcement methods is required. As
r.
Lilienthal must know, his book makes a great deal more out of
the problem of size than do either the Supreme Court decisions or
antitrust prosecutions. Perhaps Mr. Galbraith would agree that
fewer mistakes have been made in antitrust prosecution than in
the administration by the government of aid to countervailing
power. A rethinking of the basic concepts as may be implied in
Mr. Galbraith's book and perhaps in Mr. Lilienthal's may bring us
to new conclusions about both antitrust policy and the role of
government. I must confess as to some uncertainty as to the
intended level of discussion in either volume. If these books are
calculated to reshape basic concepts, I am afraid they jump too
quickly from an incomplete discussion of basic ideas to a reformulation of government policy. Until there is a further reformulation of basic ideas, it might be well to protect the antitruit forum
from either a consideration of good or bad countervailing power
or such matters as the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
firm's price or wage policies.
M. A. Adelman*
The late Joseph Schumpeter was a great economist, a great con*Associate Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
sometime Lecturer, Harvard Law School.
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servative, and one who loved irony and paradox. How delighted
he would have been to see his ideas' given wide currency by those
on the liberal side of the fence! But Messrs. Galbraith and Lilienthal also have a good deal to offer on related topics. Both books
are timely. One welcomes the authors' insistence that we take a
good hard look at the institution in terms of our needs and
interests.
Mr. Galbraith's principal theses may be outlined, in over-simplified fashion: (1) Capitalism was formerly regulated by competition, which served both to allocate resources properly and to
prevent severe depressions. But the growth of concentration and
big business has replaced competition with oligopoly whose economic results are the same as monopoly. (2) Since big business
exists fundamentally because of economies of large scale production-including business know-how as an important economy-it
is futile and even pernicious to advocate large-scale dissolution.
(3) Furthermore, oligopoly is "an almost perfect instrument for
inducing technical change" (p. 91), and higher standards of
living. (4) Competition has been replaced as the social regulator
by "countervailing power." This is exercised (a) by large buyers
in their markets, and (b) also by labor and farmers through the
State. (5) Our government and people, conservative and liberal
alike, are deeply committed to anti-depression fiscal policy, and
those who denounce deficit spending will be just as quick to use it
as their opponents. (6) Countervailing power works well in a
deflationary setting, but poorly in inflation. So do fiscal and
monetary policies-overbalanced budgets, restricted credit, and
the like. Direct price and wage controls are also necessary
(pp. 205-6).
My own comments can best be set out in the same order. (1)
There is no reason to believe that the economy is any more oligopolistic or less competitive than it was a century ago. The
number of firms in a given industry may be fewer than in 1853;
the number in a given market, where prices and production are
determined, may be more. The reason is simply that markets
have expanded, largely but by no means wholly because of transportation costs falling to a small fraction of 1853 levels. There
is no evidence, in or out of Galbraith, that competition has declined.
If it was once a sufficient regulator of the economy, it still is. But
in one respect it never was. Business cycles have existed as long
as capitalist enterprise, and competition never prevented them.
1.

SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,

SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

63-106 (1947).
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There is no reason to suppose that the prevalence of big business
had anything to do with the Great Depression.
(2) For reasons to be indicated below, I think that this formulation is not incorrect, but not helpful either.
(3) The alleged opposition between competition and technological
progress is difficult to accept. Where profits on old methods and
old products are melted away by competition, the urge is greatest
to seek the profits of new products and methods. Conversely,
where profits can be maintained by monopolies or cartels, the urge
is less. Surely a comparison of Europe with the United States
confirms the theory; even more to the point is a comparison with
under-developed countries, with their small-scale industries monopolizing even smaller markets. The better record of American
industry is more plausibly explained by a more competitive environment than by oligopoly per se. For the other nations have more
oligopoly and less progress.
It is easy to compare the dramatic achievements of certain
oligopolized industries with the apparently poor record of certain
unconcentrated industries. But a closer look inspires some doubt
about any generalization. Productivity has not increased any
faster in one group or the other-although I hasten to add that
the scientific study of the phenomenon is scarcely begun. Two able
studies of industrial innovation2 reveal, as one would expect, a
mixed picture. Thus, "[t] he lack of strong competitive pressure at
times permitted General Electric [rather than develop fluorescent
lighting] to concentrate its attention on improving the older
incandescent lamp which would not endanger its established interest in the status quo." 3
Again, one may compare the unconcentrated coal industry with
the concentrated oil industry, to the advantage of the latter. But
drilling for oil is done by an industry of contractors far more
diffused and unconcentrated than even the coal industry.4 They
have adopted innovations made partly by themselves, partly by
other segments of what we call "the" oil industry. Similarly,
bituminous coal productivity has greatly benefited through innovations by machinery manufacturers who are not included in "the"
coal industry. Thus the comparison is partly vitiated by artificial
industry boundaries.
Furthermore, industries vary a great deal in what may be called
2. BRIGHT, THE ELECTRIc LAmP INDUSTRY (1950); MACLAURIN, INVENTION AND
INNOVATION IN THE RADIO INDUSTRY (1949).

3. BRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 455. The untimely death of Dr. Arthur
A. Bright in May, 1953, was not only a personal loss to all who knew him, but an
irreplaceable loss to the study of industrial economics.

4. Hodges and Cookenboo, The Oil Well Drilling Contractor Industry-A Case
Study in Pure Competition, RICE INSTITUTE PAMPHLET, ch. ii (July, 1953).
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their "innovation potential." Research and development may
require large firms in some industries, but not in others. Whether
the structure fits the requirements is something about which we
know too little to generalize.
(4) The meaning of "countervailing power" is ambiguous. (a)
It may refer to a buyer large enough to rise above localized monopolies and seek better alternatives elsewhere; to integrate vertically
if suppliers try to hold him up; to violate conventional industry
boundaries with new products, etc. But this is simply competitionto call it "countervailing power" is to use two new words where
one old one would do. A large buyer may also have power to obtain
lower prices than his rivals. Depending on the circumstances,
this may promote competition, or it may inhibit it by making
entry more difficult. Here are at least three possible kinds of
countervailing power, each with a different implication for prices
and production. No blanket approval or disapproval seems appropriate. They all exist; we do not know how widespread or quantitatively important they are.
The heavily emphasized distinction between "original power"
and "countervailing power" also seems irrelevant to the effect.
A cure is countervailing power against a disease, but proverbially
the cure may be worse than the disease.
(b) It is doubtful that the growth of unions, or of farm legislation, can be explained as countervailing power to big business.
There is no correlation between the degree of unionization on the
one hand, and size or concentration or oligopoly on the other.
Some of the largest unions are in the most atomized industries.
And the farmer escaped the control of (mostly small-town) monopolists years before he obtained parity. One may consider unions
desirable, and also approve some protection for farmers against
the erratic and economically senseless price-swings to which they
are peculiarly subject. These are not live issues; what we really
want to know is how far it is desirable to go in either direction.
I venture to believe that Mr. Galbraith is not pleased to see the
butter producers and the feed producers, each mobilized into a
single bargaining agent, fighting it out in the office of the Secretary of Agriculture. 5 The butter support program is a national
scandal, and there are more in the offing.
Nor could Mr. Galbraith have enjoyed the spectacle of steel
management and steel labor bringing their 1952 dispute into the
5. See "Dairy Group Will Take Lower Butter Price But Ask Feed Cost," AP
dispatch in the Boston Herald, May 20, 1953, p. 26: "[T]he dairy industry advisory
group has expressed willingness to take an immediate cut in the 65 cent-a-pound
support price for butter . . . [T]his offer by the dairy group . .. was based on the
consideration that price supports for dairy feeds, particularly corn, be reduced too."
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White House, the President seizing the mills and the Supreme
Court snatching them back. This is no formula for social stability;
it is unwieldy at best and dangerous at any time.
(5) This seems to me an obvious fact.
(6) Mr. Galbraith states that in a competitive economy, inflationary pressure-an excess of spending power over the current
values of goods-will result in a definite and limited price increase.
I think Mr. Galbraith would be in a minority of one among economists if he seriously maintained this position, and it is doubtful
that he does. There is no such thing as a price rise closing the
inflationary gap. For the recipients of the higher prices thereby
gain higher spendable income-whether they are pure competitors,
or corporation stockholders and employees, or anything else. The
excess demand stays in operation and keeps raising prices until
higher taxes or larger savings cut it down.
Under a regime of countervailing power, this inflationary spiral
is considered possible. Since Mr. Galbraith favors such a regime,
this warning does credit to his intellectual honesty. However, the
spiral is only dramatized by price-wage bargaining. It exists under
any degree of competition. Perhaps the spiral is aggravated by
the existence of labor and management groupings; this is still an
unsettled question among economists.
Space is lacking to explain why I take a less optimistic view of
direct controls in a semi-mobilized economy than does Mr. Galbraith.
Mr. Lilienthal's basic thesis is that Big Business is a great economic and social asset, and ought to be accepted as such. He is
deeply irritated (justly so, in my opinion) at people whose attitude
toward the material fruits of bigness is similar to that of the
Empress Maria Theresa at the partition of Poland: "She wept,
indeed, but she took." Bigness is certainly necessary for our high
and expanding standard of living and for our national security.
But the crucial question is not whether size is necessary but how
much size is necessary. If the five biggest steel corporations were
split into (say) fifteen, the successors would all be big; steel must
be made on a big scale. Whether we would be better off with the
big five or the big fifteen is the real problem, and Mr. Lilienthal
gives us no guiding thoughts, no set of criteria, by which to make
up our minds. If bigness is simply good per se, that firm is best
which is biggest. And since Mr. Lilienthal expressly approves
diversification and integration in conjunction with bigness, we
arrive at the ideal of One Big Corporation-the socialist state.
Of course Mr. Lilienthal would detest this conclusion. But
clearly something has been left out of the argument-the selective
force of competition in deciding where and to what extent big or
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small business units are necessary. The assumption is that the
competitive process is, in the long run, much better than any
individual or group for determinations of this kind. Or as R. B.
Heflebower has put it: "No person or group of persons, public
or private, is qualified to judge what is good for the economy.
Only the market can make that appraisal."
Mr. Lilienthal, on the contrary, proposes a Basic Economic
Act under which "the legal test Bigness would have to face would
thenceforth be [the judgment of "the court or tribunal"] whether
the particular aspect of size challenged by the government does
in fact further the public interest" (p. 187, italics in original).
Such a law might well be subtitled An Act to Prevent Unemployment in the Legal Profession, and I hope that nothing like it will
ever be passed. I also suspect that Mr. Lilienthal would like it no
better than I do. For he does not want either Congress or a commission deciding how big is too big (p. 159).
Mr. Lilienthal probably believes that competition as we have
it today is an effective regulator, but he does not investigate or
touch on the problems of choosing the criteria of effective competition. I am unable to say whether he thinks that big corporations have no power to act in any anti-social fashion, or that they
have too keen a sense of social responsibility to do so. Granted
that prevailing standards of business ethics are considerably
higher than they were a generation ago, it does not seem wise
to make noblesse oblige the foundation of our economic policy.
I do not allege that Mr. Lilienthal does propose this; I can not
discern that he rejects it.
This ambiguity proceeds, I think, from an ambiguity about the
workings of competition in our economy. Mr. Lilienthal properly
(by my standards) emphasizes that the essential benefits of competition are innovation. But this is coupled with a curious and often
confused aversion to price competition, as though there were some
kind of antithesis. He points to the superiority of quality competition over price competition. In fact, they are closely interdependent. Whether or not a given increment to quality, or a
greater "suitability to the user's needs" (p. 52), are worth while,
is strictly a matter of comparing the extra quality with the extra
price. Where individual and business consumers can choose freely,
some take the higher quality and some the lower prices. But if
there is an agreement to avoid price competition, "quality competition" is usually a social loss, especially when it degenerates
into gadgeteering. I sympathize with Mr. Lilienthal's belief that
the virtue of competition is not a lot of little competitors crying
6.

Heflebower, Economics of Size, 24 J. Bus. OF U. oF CHI. 253 (1951).
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their wares at prices that dance madly up and down within the hour.
But he reaches the opposite and no more desirable extreme. Yet he
also points with pride to our large distribution firms like Sears
and A. & P. Their essential contribution was to inject price competition into an area-retail trade-where it had been very sadly
lacking. The mail-order catalogue represents price competition
on a scale undreamed of in 1890.
Mr. Lilienthal is also inconsistent on the relation between the
number of competitors and the intensity of competition. He seems
to think there is little if any real relation. Yet he insists on the
importance of inter-commodity competition, and of the "one big
market" of the Continental United States. But their importance
lies in the fact that they introduce more competitors into any
given market. The crucial question is particular, not general:
how much competition is introduced into the specific market at
the specific time? Some of Mr. Lilienthal's own examples seem to
me to argue convincingly on the side of another and different kind
of public policy from the one he urges. Thus, he hints broadly
that TVA was faced with high non-competitive prices for copper
transmission lines; but the monopoly situation was circumvented
by turning to aluminum cable at a considerable saving. It may be
asked: What of buyers who were businessmen, who had to worry
about making a profit, and were subject to the pressure of time
and the cost of interrupted production? If there had existed not
one monopolist of aluminum but a few (big) competitors, might
not aluminum cable have been more widely and cheaply available?
And if, in addition, the antitrust laws had been more vigilantly enforced, would not the rigging of copper prices have been impossible
even without any special Government intervention?
Again, Mr. Lilienthal thinks a conspiracy to fix prices or limit
output of cotton or wool "would be undesirable in theory and [unlawful], but its effect on consumers would be largely irrelevant"
(p. 62). Nothing could be more untrue. A monopoly of wool and
cotton could exact much higher prices than now prevail, because
wool and cotton still supply the great bulk of our textile needs
despite the inroads of the synthetic fibers. Thirty years hence this
may no longer be true; but as of the here and now it is.
Perhaps it is this incomplete (as I consider it) view of competition that underlies Mr. Lilienthal's view on public policy.
Perhaps he has been disturbed by the tendency in some recent antitrust decisions to make size an offense per se. I have myself strongly
criticized these decisions. Yet it may be permissible for an economist to argue the virtues of a common-law system to a lawyer. Must
we not distinguish between the logical implications of a decision,

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

and the prediction that the courts will actually follow those implications? In seeking to settle particular cases, judges may unknowingly
or half-knowingly invoke general principles which some of us
consider thoroughly bad. But the arguments of counsel, the writings
in the law reviews (which Cardozo once called the highest courts
of appeal!), and the climate of discussion reveals those implicit
major premises for what they are, and if unacceptable to the
dominant sentiment of the community, the undesired stream of
doctrine is lost in the sands of hostility or neglect. The decisions
which both Mr. Lilienthal and I dislike-since he scarcely mentions
any, I may be presuming too much-have not thus far made any
substantial difference in the rules of the American business game.
I hope this will continue to be the case; but nothing is gained and
much may be lost by insisting that these decisions are ruining
us. Ruination may then seem quite tolerable!
Forest D. Siefkin*
Twenty-five years ago, a lawyer or a businessman would not
have been asked to review books on economics and it is somewhat
unlikely that the two books here considered would have been considered for a law review. Economists, lawyers and businessmen
all operated in more or less separate compartments with little or no
communication between them, except that the businessmen were
required to consult the lawyers from time to time. This was not
true, however, for the economists. It was a rare business institution or a rare government bureau that boasted an economist. To
the general public even the traditional theories of economics were at
most contained in text books opened at college and neglected ever
afterwards.
The last score of years changed that. Economists became the
medicine men of the New Deal. There were almost as many kinds
as there were kinds of engineers or Democrats. At the time of the
depression began the debates over Keynesian doctrines which have
continued to this time and which divided most economists into two
major groups of Keynesian and Anti-Keynesian, with many variations in each. All kinds of economists began to be listed in the
salary classification plans which were being formulated in and out
of Government. They came to the Government first as advisors,
but later as administrators of almost every Government activity.
Most of these activities affected the domestic economy, the foreign
economy and the national defense in some degree.
Mr. Galbraith was one of those who came from academic life
*Vice President and General Counsel, International Harvester Company.
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to Government work and became both an advisor and an executive.
He had wide experience as an administrator of Government price
control operations. Other experience, besides his academic work,
has been in other Government service. Except for a period as
editor of Fortune Magazine, which can hardly be considered business experience, all of his time has been spent in education or
Government.
His book American Capitalism draws from these experiences
in analyzing the nature of American capitalism as he conceives it
and in propounding a theory which he calls "the concept of countervailing power." Mr. Galbraith's conception of the economic world
bears little resemblance to reality, as this reviewer has seen it.
Although in his preface he addresses his book to diligent laymen
readers and says, "There may be some-I hope not too much-that
such a reader will find implausible, but there will be little that he
will fail to understand." In spite of this assurance this writer is
not certain that he does understand all of Mr. Galbraith's arguments. With such a reservation, here is an over-simplified outline
of his economic world.
A. Businessmen and conservatives still view the world through
the theories of perfect competition developed by the classical
economists in England.
B. Competition is the first requirement of this system.
C. The present American economy is typified by industries consisting of a few large producers surrounded by less important
small producers, such a constellation being referred to as
an "oligopoly."
D. In this economy there is no price competition and therefore no
competition that produces the classical checks and balances
because,
(1) There is a "convention" against price competition in
oligopolies, and,
(2) Price leaders become common and there is a tacit understanding that their prices will be followed.
E. Mr. Galbraith does concede some rivalry in his economic
world, consisting of,
(1) Wasteful amounts of money spent in advertising persuasion and selling.
(2) Technological advances. (Mr. Galbraith does not seem
to emphasize this aspect of competition.)
F. The growth and market power of oligopolies have brought
about "countervailing powers" by the development of large
buyers and large labor unions and other groups acting together.
G. These so-called countervailing powers have replaced competition and in deflationary cycles of the economy protect the public much as would competition under the classical theory.
H. In times of inflation, however, countervailing power does not
work because,
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In such times a strong labor union and strong producer
will effect a coalition, since the producer has no interest
in keeping wages down and can very easily pass them on
in the price.
(2) Large buyers lose their countervailing powers because of
strong demand for goods, enabling the producer to sell
to anyone.
At this point even the amateur reader of economic theory will
recognize many familiar ideas. The oligopoly theory has been discussed in much economic literature and the theory of imperfect or
monopolistic competition has become a well-known theory. The
new ingredient which has been added by Mr. Galbraith's book is
the proposal that there is no competition in an economy which is
typified by oligopoly and that countervailing powers have developed which replace competition in deflationary swings of the
economy.
Mr. Galbraith's view makes the American businessman either
very stupid or very insincere. He assumes that the businessman
either has not changed his economic theories beyond those of the
19th Century, or if he knows better, uses the theory of perfect competition to justify a special position in the present economic world.
It is further implied, I believe, that he has no feeling of social
responsibility either to better the condition of his employees or to
furnish the customer with better products at the lowest possible
price, or to play the part of a good citizen. Mr. Galbraith's picture
of the businessman is clearly of one whose only interest is to
obtain the largest profit at the expense of workers and customers.
Many people believe, on the contrary, that the last twenty years
have developed in the American businessman an awareness of the
long-range advisability of exercising whatever powers he may
have in a background of social and economic responsibility.
The writer is not sure that he understands what Mr. Galbraith
implies when he states that there is a "convention" against pricecutting in "oligopoly." Perhaps he does not mean to imply anything
like agreement or conspiracy. If he means only "custom," then
the word "convention," which under some uses implies agreement
or active collaboration, then it seems that he has used an unfortunate word and one which is likely to create an atmosphere of prejudice. The writer would have the same comments with respect
to the word "coalition" when used to describe the relations between
organized labor and industry during periods of inflation.
Of course, competition in a manufacturing industry, where there
are relatively few producers, is different from competition in the
wheat market. That does not mean there is no price competition.
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Mr. Galbraith
A. Overlooks price competition between products, such as oil
vs. coal, copper vs. aluminum; wool vs. synthetics, automobiles
vs. houses, etc.
B. Assumes that an important member of a large industry would
be reluctant to reduce prices because of fear that a competitor
in turn would cut his price, or would be in trouble in attempting to compete. The writer has been exposed to many important discussions in this field and all he can say is that this
assumption is simply not true. On the contrary, only satisfaction is expressed when a price can be lowered so as to
create a problem for a competitor. In discussing prices, one
of the primary factors is the fear that a price may be named
so high that a competitor will get the business and the pricer
will lose it.
In the same category are the author's conclusions from his
analysis of the cigarette business. His assumptions may not be
true even in that business, but it is certain that an industry such
as the one this reviewer is familiar with principally thinks of
cost in pricing unless a competitor's lower prices force us down.
After costs and proposed profit are estimated, the pricer customarily
looks at the competitor's prices to see if it will be necessary to cut
the margin of profit in order to stay in the market. This is the
typical case. There is certainly no "convention" or "custom" that
this writer knows, in the heavy manufacturing industry, which
prevents lowering a price. For Mr. Galbraith to say that such a
"convention" is typical of American industry seems a generalization
almost bordering on irresponsibility.
It would be interesting to ask members of our Sales Department
whether they believe there is no price competition in selling any
of our machines or replacement parts, or to ask our price and contract department how often it has refrained from lowering a price
for fear the lower price would be met by a competitor's cut.
Mr. Galbraith has neatly classified market powers into original
powers and countervailing powers. He seems to believe, for example, that the antitrust pressure on the A. & P. stores was an
economic monstrosity because it disturbed the development of
countervailing power. Only a moment's consideration will indicate
the practical problems of attempting to hold the balance even between the original and countervailing power so that they offset
each other. Such an attempt could only be made through Government action.
That leads to the really depressing part of the book. The theme
of the last chapter is that countervailing power and application of
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the Keynesian theory will protect the public and assure it adequate
goods at reasonable prices in times of depression. It will not work,
however, in times of inflation. Then in time of war, or preparation
for war, the scope of private decision becomes substantially narrower and capitalism must be modified by extensive centralized decisions (Government intervention). One can hardly doubt that
Professor Galbraith believes that major revisions in American
capitalism are now a probability. This may take the form of
Government control of prices or of decisions that are now in the
hands of business management, or it may be public ownership of
the instruments of production. One way or another, his view is
that in times of inflation Government will tend to appropriate to
itself the making of decisions now in the hands of business management. This, of course, also means decisions now in the hands of
labor organizations and, as a necessary corollary, now in the hands
of individuals.
The entire book seems to point out to the reviewer, and again he
may be unable to read Mr. Galbraith's book properly, that he is
making a case for more Government intervention and more
Government controls; a case which, if accepted as a plan of action
rather than an economic theory, fills this writer with apprehension and dismay. Nevertheless, the book is a very stimulating and
interesting one, which, taken along with Mr. Lilienthal's, states as
strong a case as has been made for increased Government controls.
In some contrast to Mr. Galbraith, David Lilienthal shows a realistic understanding of the operations of larger business units in
American industry. He has carefully catalogued all the advantages
and, it seems to me, presents a convincing argument against indiscriminate divestiture or hamstringing of large business units
simply because they are big.
To Lilienthal the liberal trust buster who believes bigness in itself is harmful is basing his theories on those of the trust busters
of the Nineteenth Century, while his surrounding circumstances
have moved far beyond. To Galbraith the business man sees the
economy in the light of the classical economist of the Nineteenth
Century, while his surrounding circumstances have traveled far
beyond his economic theories. It may be as the result of prejudice
or self-interest, but Lilienthal's position in this respect seems the
sounder one to me.
In many respects, however, Galbraith and Lilienthal are in substantial agreement. They both recognize the beneficial results of
large scale units, and they both oppose the indiscriminate breaking
up of business units merely because of size and because of a few
producers in industry. They both recognize the limitations upon
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the actions of business management that have arisen in the Twentieth Century, such as increased power of large buyers, increased
power of labor unions, technological research and other factors.
To Lilienthal this is competition, or, as he styles it, "new competition." To Galbraith these are "countervailing powers." Of
course the cataloguing of Galbraith's Countervailing Powers against
Lilienthal's forces of New Competition would show that they are
not in all cases the same. For example, Lilienthal believes advertising has performed a valuable function in New Competition,
whereas to Galbraith advertising is not only not a countervailing
power, but is an economic waste. Lilienthal's New Competition
has been contributed to by the increased sense of social responsibility of business management and its accountability to groups
other than shareholders, such as to its workers and to government.
In Galbraith's view, this sense of social responsibility is not mentioned as a Countervailing Power. Lilienthal, of course, does not
distinguish between the effects of his New Competition in inflationary markets and deflationary markets. Galbraith's Countervailing Powers, he believes, will not work under serious inflationary
conditions.
It is interesting to observe the attitudes of the two men towards
the role of Government in present industrial economic matters.
While Galbraith is not specific as to the action Government must
take when Countervailing Powers break down in times of inflation,
nevertheless it is his view that the Government must then step in
and take away from business management many of the decisions
that are now in its hands. In other words, in times of inflation it
will be necessary to resort to "centralized" decisions. I think this
implies the telling of management what prices to charge, how many
employees to employ, what to pay them, what products to manufacture, and ordering them with respect to many other things that
now are the prerogative of management. Just where Lilienthal
stands on this is not clear. In discussing the new role of Government in the business economy, which he believes is one of the
elements which bring into being his New Competition, he makes
a statement, it seems to me, full of disturbing implications:
"Machinery will be set up where it is not already now available
for government participation in many economic relationships
and transactions which 40 years ago or less were regarded as
strictly private matters to be determined by impersonal forces
of economic powers in the hands of parties to the transaction."
(Emphasis mine.)
Certainly much of this machinery has already been set up. Is it
part of Lilienthal's theory that the machinery already set up has
contributed greatly to the effectiveness of his New Competition,
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and that as time goes on much more of the same kind of machinery
will be needed? I am afraid this is the implication of the statement referred to and of his view as to the contributions the new
role of government has made to his New Competition. If so, he has
gone even further than Galbraith, who believes such "centralized
decisions" are necessary only under serious inflationary conditions.
Lilienthal seems to believe that this intervention of government,
to a continually increasing extent, is needed for his New Competition to be effective. The basic problem involved is whether
enterprise shall be free or whether it shall be limited through
government intervention, and if government intervention is required, at what point is it required and what form should it take.
Lilienthal's views on this basic problem are not at all clear at this
point.
However, when he makes his proposal for basic economic law
(Chapter 22), he seems to proceed on a different theory. We must
decide, he writes, what kind of country we wish and then he describes those things that we wish from our industrial economy.
They are described in very general terms and would seem desirable
to almost everyone. He would then develop these objectives into
factors that could be made the basis of a determination whether
an industrial unit is acting in the public interest. The evil to be
corrected would be acting against the public interest.
It would seem that such a system would work like this: If the
authorities believed in any particular case that a company was not
conducting itself in the public interest, a proceeding could be
commenced. The question at issue: Is or is not the company acting
in the public interest in the light of the desirable general factors
proposed by the author? This is a very different type of government intervention from direct government control or centralized
decision, such as price control, wage control or product control.
It would seem to contemplate proceeding individually against industrial units. If it should be found that such a unit was not acting
in the public interest, relief would be granted, such as dissolution
or injunction or other remedies which would insure that thereafter
the unit or its resulting components would act in the public interest. This is much the way the antitrust laws operate today, except,
of course, that the standards for the determination of violation of
the law are entirely different from the standards proposed by
Lilienthal.
The objections to changing the standards seem fairly obvious.
First, even though new standards are developed as the result of
the Very general statements proposed, the court or administrative
agency enforcing the law would for a long time have great latitude
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to impose its own ideas of public interest. We have been about
sixty years in defining the present language and it seems too bad
to start another sixty years (or more) of interpretation. Secondly,
it would seem that the approach of other bodies, the latest and most
inclusive being the new committee announced in August by the
Attorney General, offers a more scientific and sounder approach
to the problem of promoting the public interest in antitrust and
related matters. I would have greater hopes of advancement of
the public interest, as well as improved understanding by business
institutions, from the work of such a committee than in following
either author reviewed here-interesting and stimulating as both
books are.
Arthur J. Goldherg*
I suppose that there is no concept more firmly embodied in our
body politic than that monopoly is an evil and that competition is
desirable. Each of these books attempts in its fashion to change
some of the connotations which are normally attached to these
politically indisputable precepts.
Mr. Lilienthal's book attempts to show that big business is
socially desirable and that, therefore, it should be encouraged and
not destroyed just because it has the potentialities of monopoly
action. Mr. Galbraith, on the other hand, accepts big business as
typically operating in monopoly fashion, but seeks to show that
forces other than competition are sufficient to enforce a socially
desirable use of our productive resources.
It is almost impossible to discuss these two books without a
basic understanding as to what our terms mean. The word "competition," for example, has two different, and, indeed, contradictory
meanings.
Mr. Galbraith, who uses the word in the sense of the traditional
economist, would say that competition is typified by the market
for agricultural products, such as wheat. But I dare say that
it would come as a distinct shock to any small wheat farmer if you
told him that he was in competition with his neighbor. Of course,
he would say, I am not in competition with my neighbor. My wheat
is no different from his, and I don't claim that it is. I don't try
to persuade anyone to buy mine rather than his. I don't undercut
his price and he doesn't undercut mine. In fact, we don't even put
prices on our wheat. We just take whatever the market price is,
for the particular grade, when we sell. Obviously, we aren't competing with each other.
*General Counsel, Congress of Industrial Organizations; General Counsel United
Steelworkers of America; senior member, Goldberg, Devoe, Brussel and Shadur,

Chicago, Illinois.
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Yet, ironically, the factors which could lead our hypothetical
farmer to deny that he competes with his neighbor, are precisely
those which identify him as a competitor in the traditional economist's terminology. Our farmer, if we asked him to illustrate what
he meant by competition, would likely refer us to the market for
motor cars or cigarettes. Yet, in Galbraith's terminology, these
markets are not competitive at all but oligopolistic and, at least
price-wise, are likely to behave as if they were monopoly markets.
Definitions are, therefore, indispensable, even in a brief discussion. Competition must mean one thing or the other. It cannot
mean both. But the word competition has a definite social value,
the subtle connotations of which cannot be avoided even if the
definition makes it clear that these connotations are not applicable.
I would prefer, therefore, to neutralize these connotations by
saying that Mr. Galbraith's competition is Classic Competitionthat is, a market in which there are a large number of sellers and
a large number of buyers of an undifferentiated product, such as
wheat, none of whom exercises any influence upon the market
price. An economy in which this kind of condition prevails for all
sellers, both of consumer goods and of the factors of production,
and in which, similarly, no buyer is large enough to influence
prices, is a Classic Competitive economy.
Competition, as the term is ordinarily used, such as in my hypothetical farmer's sense, the competition of cigarette or automobile
manufacturers, I shall call Ordinary Competition. In this usage,
a competitor tries to build a better mouse-trap, or to sell his brand
for less than his neighbors, instead of producing an undifferentiated product and offering it on the market for whatever it will
bring.
I lay such emphasis upon definition because I believe that much
of the burden of both of the books under consideration here consists
of an assault upon ghosts which exist only as the result of a confusion of definitions. The thesis of Mr. Galbraith's book, for
example, seems to be that competition can no longer be relied upon
as the governing force in our economy. His theory, in capsule form,
is that our economy works efficiently because a force, which he
describes as countervailing power, operates in place of the competition which has long since ceased to exist. I would like to suggest
that his premise as to lack of competition is correct only if Ordinary
Competition and Classic Competition are assumed to be the same
thing.
Mr. Lilienthal, on the other hand, urges, as at least part of his
basic thesis, that real competition can be effectively provided under
conditions of Bigness and decries those who would eliminate
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Bigness because of its unused potentialities for the destruction of
competition. But, of course, Bigness is consistent only with
Ordinary Competition-not with Classic Competition.
The difference in the definitions of competition, furthermore,
indicates quite clearly the difference in approach and method of
the two books. Mr. Galbraith, as a professional economist, is aware
that it has been theoretically proven that, given any state of community resources and desires, the highest level of economic efficiency
and the best distribution of production effort, in terms of those resources and desires, will be achieved automatically in a classically
competitive economy. Monopoly at any point will distort the distribution of productive effort and reduce the economy's efficiency.
Competition long has rested its claim as a preferred way of economic life upon this proof.
The proof, however, applies only to a condition of Classic Competition. It does not apply to what I have called Ordinary Competition. Indeed, what I have called Ordinary Competition exhibits,
more often than not, the characteristics which, in the Classic model,
are described as monopoly.
If this is so, says Mr. Galbraith, why does the economy work so
well? He does not doubt that it does in fact work. The problem
which he seeks to meet is the assumed contradiction between that
fact and the classical theory.
Such grave problems do not much concern Mr. Lilienthal. His
primary object is to demonstrate what Mr. Galbraith assumesthat the economy has worked well under conditions of Bigness
(which almost always is, in Mr. Galbraith's terminology, monopoly).
Under a variety of headings, Mr. Lilienthal cites example after
example to show that the prejudice against Bigness as such, which
he finds in the antitrust laws and in the mores of our society, is
erroneous. If it is possible to find some theoretical basis for his
approach, that basis would seem to be simply that modern production is, in most areas, carried on under conditions of long run
decreasing social cost. The bigger the business, the more efficiently
it can serve society. As implied by Mr. Lilienthal, this is not a
static concept as to the cost of production at any given point of time.
It derives from the ability of big business, as opposed to small
business, to conduct extensive research, to sell its products by the
use of large scale advertising, to provide for stable employment and
to create conditions of progress. In his view it is Bigness which
provides sufficient resources for industry to take the long, rather
than the short, view.
Coupled with Mr. Lilienthal's uncritical admiration of the eco-
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nomic advantages of size is the feeling that corporate management
in enterprises of great size becomes less responsive to the purely
economic interests of the stockholders and more responsive to the
needs of the community and the desires of society. On reflection,
however, this may merely be an example of the ability of big
business to take the long run viewpoint. I do not think that Mr.
Lilienthal seriously believes that corporate management could
justify to its stockholders any action which would not maximize
present profits for the enterprise, if it was not able to argue that
the course of action taken would create the advantageous public
relations which are essential to the maximization of profits in the
long run. An enterprise which today says "The public be damned"
runs the risk of public disapproval and governmental intervention
in its operations which, in the long run, may redound to the monetary disadvantage of the stockholders.
Mr. Lilienthal's treatment is superficial. It is superficial because
the use of the technique of simply recalling examples which come to
mind, without careful examination as to whether there are not
other, and contrary, examples in the same field, cannot really pretend to be a fair or systematic analysis. It is easy, for example, to
make the broad statement that only a big business can afford to
smooth out dips of employment and thus provide for some degree
of stability in employment. But if one examines the history of
guaranteed wage plans one would find that it is the smaller companies which have pioneered in this field. Presumably when Big
Business gets around to agreeing to guaranteed wage plans, it
will be possible to say, as Mr. Lilienthal does say of pensions, that
"the outstanding plans are those of the larger enterprises" (p. 106).
It will be possible to say that because the plans of the larger enterprises will cover much more significant segments of the economy.
But this, of course, simply repeats the premise that Big Business
is big.1
1. Many other examples of uncritical generalities can be found.
The discussion of color television (Pp. 162 et seq.), for example, does not even
suggest that what may have happened was a deliberate industry refusal to accept
a non-compatible system at any early date (before there were "television sets in
millions of homes") so as to create a substantial problem of compatibility and thus
require a much more complex and expensive system of color and delay its introduction until the black-and-white market was substantially saturated.
Similarly, the summary dismissal (Pp. 148 et seq.) of the question of whether
Big Business does not have an advantage in presenting its viewpoint to the public
is somewhat surprising to one who has learned, through experience, that it is
virtually impossible to obtain adequate public recognition of labor's viewpoint in a
major industrial dispute such as the steel strike of 1952.
The danger of uncritically reciting examples of the benefits of Bigness is that,
after a while, you begin just to recite the fact of Bigness and assume the benefits,
because after all, the enterprise could not have grown so large if it did not perform
its functions well. Thus, for example, Mr. Lilienthal marvels at the size and
growth of the Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association. But, as
far as I can see, all he says about it is that it is big.
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Mr. Lilienthal does, at the end, attempt to conclude his paean to
Bigness with some overall conclusions as to amendments of the
antitrust laws. But I cannot believe that he means his suggestions
to be taken seriously. He assumes, on the basis of one dissenting
opinion, that size itself is today illegal under the antitrust laws
and proposes a substitute. The substitute is a Basic Economic Act
under which the legal test to be met by any monopoly would be
whether it "furthers the public interest." What standards are to
be used? Such measuring rods as "the criteria suggested throughout this book, and others of that character" (p. 187) !
Mr. Lilienthal's inability to formulate standards for his proposed
Basic Economic Act derives, I think, from the lack of any basic
theory as to why the economy operates efficiently under conditions
of Bigness. If we had any idea as to what the underlying conditions
were for beneficent as opposed to malignant forms of Bigness, the
standards would be formulated in terms of those conditions. But
no standards are offered. Indeed, it is never satisfactorily explained
why, if some Bigness is good, more Bigness would not be even
better, with the ultimate conclusion that one big corporation would
be best for all.
In making these critical observations, I do not, of course, seriously
undercut Mr. Lilienthal's basic proposition that our economy has
functioned, and functioned well under conditions of Bigness. I do
not doubt the advantages of size. Nor do I doubt that the existence
of size does not always entail the dire consequences which, in the
classical system, are necessarily thought to follow from monopoly.
But the fact that evil does not necessarily follow from size is not
the same thing as saying that it never does, or even that it usually
doesn't. Nor does a mere recital of the good performance of the
economy in the immediate past prove that the performance might
not have been better under other conditions.
It is a measure of the difference between the Lilienthal and Galbraith books that Mr. Galbraith assumes, for his starting point,
that the performance has been good. But, he says, this performance
has taken place under conditions which are characterized as monopoly in our economic theory. We not only have few sellers and
differentiated products in most markets, we also have a convention
against price competition. Theoretically, then, we should have
monopoly performance-that is, high prices, excessive profits, and
a misallocation of resources. But apparently we do not. Hence,
he concludes, there must be something missing in the theory.
"Countervailing power" is his attempt to supply the missing
element.
Mr. Galbraith defines countervailing power as market power
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exerted, not by competitors, but by those on the opposite side of
the market. He urges that competition is not the only market
control over monopoly in the sale of products (or in the purchase
of factors). The use of countervailing power by the buyer (or
seller), he says, will prevent the monopoly seller from utilizing his
monopoly position to the detriment of the community. It is asserted,
although not proven, that the existence of monopoly power tends to
create countervailing power, although it is also recognized that
where countervailing power is not automatically created, the state
may intervene to assist in its creation.
One of the conclusions which necessarily derives from the theory
is that the power of the state, as expressed in the antitrust law,
should be used only in the case of imbalance in the economic power
of buyers and sellers in any particular market. Where sellers hold
a monopoly position, organizations of buyers to countervail that
power should not be prosecuted, nor should organizations of sellers
to countervail the economic power of buyers. The antitrust law
should not be used, in short, simply to destroy or weaken market
power without reference to the existence or strength of such power
on the other side of the particular market.
That this conclusion is sound cannot be doubted. The labor
market provides a superb example. The classical economic model
presumes, among other things, a number of buyers and sellers large
enough so that no single buyer or seller can materially influence
the price established by the market. While this premise may have
been an approximation of the truth for some commodities at some
periods of history, it has never been true, even approximately, with
respect to the industrial labor market. The worker has always been
at a disadvantage as compared with the employer. As an individual
economic entity, he is unable to withhold his labor, he has the most
imperfect knowledge of possible alternative employment, and he
is highly immobile. The single employer who dealt with thousands
of individual employees was obviously in a position to take extraordinary advantage of those employees.
The organization of the labor union is thus an example of an
attempt to balance the imperfections of the labor market. By joining together, individual workers could achieve a measure of economic power which would approach equality with the economic
power of the employer. Today, in non-economic discussion, this
power is called "bargaining" power. The very term itself, of course,
recognizes that the price of labor is not set automatically by market
forces, as in the classic competitive model, but is an administered
price, determined by bargaining within limits established by the
economic system.
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It is important to recognize that the bargaining power which
unions thus achieve in the market for labor is just an answer to
the virtual monopoly which employers already hold in the purchase
2
of labor at any particular plant. As I have pointed out elsewhere,
it is always appropriate to ask those who cry "labor monopoly"
and demand that labor unions be subjected to the antitrust laws
whether they are seeking to establish competition in place of the
monopoly they decry, and if so, competition between whom? The
theoretical economist would presumably urge that any labor union
is monopolistic if it destroys the competition between working men
for jobs. If they believed that competition should be legally required in this market, they would theoretically, therefore, urge the
abolition of all labor unions. The politicians who, more typically
than the economists, urge application of the antitrust laws to
labor, have so far not openly expressed themselves as having this
objective. I have yet to meet a politician who follows his assertion
that labor unions are monopolistic with a statement that what he
desires is the return of competition among workers for available
jobs, with vacancies going to those who are willing to work for the
lowest wages.
The real question, with respect to labor unions, is not whether
competition should be restored in the labor market. When such
competition does exist, in the absence of a labor organization, it is
altogether one-sided and works only to the advantage of employers.
Anglo-American law has recognized this consistently during the
past few centuries, and the mere combination of employees has
never been held, in modern times, to be a monopoly or restraint of
trade. Once this is conceded, the application of the antitrust laws
to labor unions makes no sense at all.
The real issue, of course, is not whether competition should be
restored to the labor market, but whether the bargaining power of
unions in the administered price market, which the labor market
is, is stronger than that of the employers. Those who say they wish
to subject labor unions to the antitrust laws in reality desire merely
to weaken unions because they presumably believe that the unions
are too strong. I submit that, once the issue is viewed in this
light, and without the value judgments which are implied in the
misleading comparison of unions with productive enterprises, the
honest answer must be that there is no evidence that the bargaining power of labor unions is superior to that of employers, or that
2. I made virtually the same argument here presented in testimony before a
committee of the Senate in 1950. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary on S.2912, 81 Cong., 2d Sess., SEN. Doc. No. 1741, Pp.
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the terms of the bargains which have been reached during the past
decade or so between employers and unions have given rise to an
unjustly high distribution of wages to workers as against the
distribution of profits to industry.
The concept of countervailing power is, then, an acceptable way
of describing the phenomenon, typically represented by labor unions,
of organization on one side of a particular market to meet a
monopoly position on the other. But this is a long way from being
a general economic principle which will explain the satisfactory
operation of our economy. Indeed, I think Mr. Galbraith's attempt
to expand his great insight into particular phenomena into a broad
theory of economic behaviour detracts, rather than adds, to the
undoubted value of his book.
A simple example of the error to which this attempt to generalize
leads is found in Mr. Galbraith's implied thesis that, since labor
unions exercise a countervailing power to that of monopoly capital,
unions are strong in those industries where an element of monopoly
power is exercised by employers in the sale of their products and
weak where no such employer power exists. Labor unions operate
in the labor market, not in the steel market or clothing market or
in any other market for the sale of a commodity. Any attempt by
unions to regulate the conditions of sale of the employer's products
should, under Mr. Galbraith's own thesis, be regarded as an im3
proper exercise of economic power.
The error thus made in generalizing the concept of countervailing
power is, I think, the root of Mr. Galbraith's further generalization
that countervailing power tends to perform its function less effectively in periods of inflation. I fail to see how the existence or
non-existence of a union can affect the market power of the employer to raise his prices and increase his revenues. That power
depends on the state of competition (or countervailing power) in
the market for the product he sells. It is not increased or decreased
by a collective bargaining agreement on wages. Certainly it has
not been my experience that, in periods of inflation, union and
industry leaders gang up to suppress competition in the sale of
products. Nor do I think that any study has shown that in periods
of inflation price increases tend to be greater in unionized rather
4
than non-unionized industries.
3. Cf. Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797 (1944).
4. That wage increases in certain industries are often followed, in magnified
form, by price increases may result, I think, from the ability which the wage
increase gives to the producers to justify the price increase to the public. If the
fear of public reaction is the "countervailing power" which restrains price increases,
then, of course, the measure of the relaxation of that power, in the case of a wage
increase, is not the amount of the wage increase itself but the amount which the
public, and the customers, can be persuaded is due to the wage increase. The latter
is often double the former.
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Other examples of the error of lumping together dissimilar
phenomena under the label of countervailing power abound. One
such example is the case of the A. & P. Company and cornflakes,
which Mr. Galbraith regards as a typical example of the use of
countervailing power. Cornflakes were being sold by three companies. A survey by A. & P. indicated that, for an investment of
$175,000, A. & P. could supply itself with cornflakes and, at the
price then charged for this delicacy, it could earn 68 percent on the
outlay. Armed with this information, A. & P. had no difficulty in
bringing down the price of cornflakes by approximately 10 percent.
While this is set forth as an example of countervailing power,
it seems clearly to be just an example of threatened competition.
What may, perhaps, be indicated by the example is the point, made
by Mr. Lilienthal, that, although freedom of entry by new competitors is greatly restricted in our economy, this may be balanced
by the increased threat of competition through the "integration"
of erstwhile purchasers. But, surely, nothing is gained by lumping
it, together with labor unions, as an example of countervailing
power; and I doubt whether any justification can be made for the
proposition that this form of countervailing power is less effective
in periods of inflation than in other periods.
Similarly, the case of agriculture seems to me to be theoretically
quite distinct. It is true, of course, that the treatment of agriculture does present an example of community action to aid a
segment of the economic community which, absent such aid, seems
to be at a disadvantage. But what has actually happened in agriculture is, of course, totally different from the use of buying power
in any market to neutralize the monopolistic position of sellers by
threatening to compete, or the threat of withholding, as in the
case of labor, to force a higher wage. What we have in agriculture
is a true example of Classic Competition, with great freedom of
entry, operating in an economy which is otherwise highly noncompetitive in the classical sense. The result, as Mr. Galbraith notes,
is manifestly unfair to the farmer. It leads not only to lower
returns to the farmer, but also to an unbalanced allocation of productive resources. Hence, the community, through Government
action, imposes restraints upon the free operation of the agricultural market which, it is hoped, will equalize the position of
agriculture with that of the non-competitive segments of the
economy, both by raising returns and by restricting production.
By urging that the various phenomena which Mr. Galbraith
lumps together as countervailing power are dissimilar, I do not
mean at all to suggest that they do not have some common characteristics. I urge simply that it is inappropriate to classify these
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various phenomena as examples of a single economic force called
countervailing power, having a conceptual unity similar to that of
the idea of competition. The examples do illustrate what I believe
is a very significant principle, but that principle is not an economic
theory in the same sense as the theory of perfect competition, but
rather a social and political concept. Stated affirmatively, that
concept is that our economy operates within the framework of a
social organization which will not tolerate obvious inequities in its
economic system. Wherever the operation of purely economic forces
would tend to create obvious distortions in what the community
regards as an appropriate distribution of the economic product,
there will be community action, or the threat of such action, through
the state, to redress the balance. The economy can be said, in this
broader sense, to be a self-regulating one. That is, state action, or
the threat of state action, will tend to minimize the distortions in
production and distribution which might occur if the sole consideration governing economic action were short run calculations of profit
and loss.
A simple example, not cited by either Mr. Lilienthal or Mr.
Galbraith, serves to highlight my point. During the war there
were, of course, price controls on steel. There was also, I suppose,
a black market in which steel was sold illegally at higher than
ceiling prices. Such a phenomenon is explainable under the conventional hypotheses as to economic behaviour. But after price
controls were removed, the quoted market price for steel did not
immediately move up to the level necessary to equate supply and
demand. There remained, for a considerable period, a "gray
market," in which steel was bought and sold above the quoted
market price. This was obviously a "monopoly" phenomenon; in
a free market the price would have risen sufficiently to avoid any
possibility of "gray market" operations. But, how is one to explain
a monopoly that keeps prices lower than they would be in a free
market? Mr. Lilienthal would perhaps suggest that the phenomenon
resulted from an acute sense of social responsibility on the part of
the corporate managements of the steel companies. My experience
with the industry would make me doubt that this sense of responsibility, which does exist, goes to the point of deliberate self-sacrifice
of profits in peacetime. It seems to me that the real reason for the
failure of the steel companies to charge what the market would
bear was the well-founded apprehension that any attempt to do so
would raise an immediate danger of government intervention.
Both political intervention and the threat of political intervention,
then, operate as very real governors in our economy. They are, of
course, not the only limitations upon monopoly, as the classical
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economists have conceived it. One of the other limitations is suggested, although not explicitly stated, both in Mr. Galbraith's discussion of the "economics of opulence" and Mr. Lilienthal's discussion of competition between "Objects of Desire."
It seems to me that a reasonable case can be made out for the
fact that the classical economic model of competition becomes
progressively less applicable to an economic society as that society
progresses beyond the bare subsistence level. Price competition
among producers in undifferentiated products is much more likely
to occur in a simple society than in one in which consumer desires
are far above the bare subsistence level. I think that it can be
assumed that as the community's wealth increases the incidence
of quasi-monopoly-by which I mean the emergence of a small
number of producers and the absence of price competition among
them-increases. But I wonder whether it is not also true that
exactly the same forces which lead to this result also lead to a
much greater competition between producers in terms of product
differentiation and also to a vast increase in the degree of substitution as between different products. In a subsistence level community, it may be extremely important that producers of any basic
commodity such as food or clothing or shelter be in perfect competition with each other, since there is virtually no possibility of
substituting one of these basic commodities for the other. But
at higher income levels the consumer's choice is not only between
one producer or another of a basic commodity, nor even between
one variety of a basic commodity as against another. At higher
income levels, the consumer's choice may be between a new automobile, a new house, an overcoat, or a refrigerator. An increase in
the price of one of these may cause a deflection of demand to another. Hence, although the number of producers of any particular
commodity may materially shrink, the number of producers who
are in competition for the same consumer dollar substantially
increases.
Summing up, we say that the power of a monopoly, or an oligopoly which acts like a monopoly, in any market in which it sells
(or buys) is subject to a kind of competition which is different
from the impersonal price dictation of the market which is specified
in the classical model, but which is real, nonetheless. Instead of
a large number of producers selling an undifferentiated product, we
have, typically, a small number of producers selling a highly
differentiated product. Instead of competition among producers,
we have competition in product variation and, in part because of
the tremendous variation in products, a high degree of product
substitution. Instead of freedom of entry by outsiders as an ever-
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present source of potential competition, we have the possibility of
vertical integration by purchasers who will undertake to supply
their own needs.
On top of all this we have a Government which will interfere in
any situation in which the existence of too much economic power is
clear. The ever-present threat of such action by the state exerts
a powerful force restraining the monopolistic elements in the
economy from pursuing the course which, in the economists' model,
they would presumably pursue.
In laying the groundwork for future development of this conception Mr. Galbraith has made a substantial contribution to our
thinking. While I see no future for the theory of countervailing
power as such, I do think it important to recognize that Classic
Competition exists in virtually no segment of our economy. We do
have competition of a different sort and in varying degrees in most
segments of our economy. Where the degree of competition is
slight and the result is a socially undesirable excess of power, the
community should, and does, act to redress the balance, either by
eliminating or hampering the effect of market forces, as in agriculture, or by giving its sanction and encouragement to the elimination
of competition among those who must bargain with the monopolist,
as in the elimination of wage competition. Mr. Galbraith's perception of this fundamental social truth and of the total inadequacy
of an approach which establishes competition as the sole ideal, to
be pursued in all sectors of the economy without discrimination,
constitutes a substantial contribution.
Joseph C. O'Mahoney*
It detracts nothing from the professional stature of David E.
Lilienthal or John Kenneth Galbraith nor from the high standard
of their respective contributions to an understanding of the modern
politico-economic problem to say that neither Big Business: A New
Era, written by the former nor American Capitalism, The Concept
of Countervailing Power, the work of the latter, presents a blueprint for action. It can, however, be said that both books reveal the
need of what may be called an economic constitution to gear free
Government to the world of modern trade and commerce.
Mr. Lilienthal sees "the new dream; a world of great machines,
with man in control, devising and making use of these inanimate
creatures to build a new kind of independence, a new awareness of
beauty, a new spirit of brotherliness," but he does not tell us how
the "man in control" is going to gain that position of power nor,
*Former United States Senator from Wyoming; Chairman, Temporary National
Economic Committee, 1938-41.
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having gained such control, how he will use it to direct this
new world of robots. With clarity and vivid detail, he draws
the picture of the expansion and achievements of Big Business,
but he gives only the vaguest outline of the new "basic economic
law" he proposes to substitute for the Sherman Act and other
antitrust laws he believes to be outmoded. Neither does he give
any hint of the form or character of the "new kind of independence" the machines are to build for mankind. Economic independence is our goal, but it may be doubted whether the machines
are equal to the task. Certainly, therefore, we must know more
about the authority proposed to be vested in the "man in control."
Doctor Galbraith seems to believe that American capitalism, that
is to say the system of private property, can be preserved, with a
minimum of government intervention, by the action and reaction
on the economy of the various groups which constitute modern
society. In his view, the classic idea of competition is in fact an
economic doctrine of the dead past for which there has already been
substituted the "countervailing power" he has described in his
book. It is, he suggests, a self-generating economic regulator just
as Adam Smith conceived competition to be.
Under the ideal competitive system, prices to the consumer
could not be fixed by private power because individual producers,
vying with one another, would hold prices down without the aid of
government. The theory of countervailing power seems merely
to substitute groups in the whole economy for individuals within
a given industry. The individual worker, who can no longer deal
equitably with his employer because the employer has become an
organization instead of an individual, seeks his salvation in a union.
Thus, in the labor market, Big Business and Big Labor, by their
interaction, determine the levels of wages and prices. Again, in
the market of supply and distribution, chain stores and mail-order
houses, co-ops and the like, exercise a pressure upon manufacturers which tends to control the economy without the intervention of managerial power by government.
More important perhaps is Dr. Galbraith's thought that countervailing power will support the antitrust laws at their most vulnerable point which he implies is their inadequacy to deal with
"single-firm control of an industry" (p. 151). Price competition
has gone into the discard, he correctly tells us, in the industries
dominated by a few firms, adding: "One can hardly doubt that, in
general, it will be much easier for countervailing power to break
into a position of market strength maintained by an imperfect
coalition of three, four or a dozen firms than into a position held
by one firm" (p. 151).
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Mr. Lilienthal agrees that price competition has really disappeared and tells us we must look for competitive effort nowadays
in "management techniques, " "better personnel practices," and
"the new technological developments," all of which he believes to
be almost inseparable from Bigness (p. 51). Dr. Galbraith notes
that the application of the Robinson-Patman Act can result in
depriving consumers of lower prices in the retail field resulting from
the vigorous bargaining power of size. The New Competition of
Lilienthal and the Countervailing Power of Galbraith may, in fact,
be the same idea and maybe after all they are merely telling us
that times have changed and business operates with a much
larger radius than formerly. It is just a different way of saying
that modern business is carried on primarily by organizations
rather than by individuals. When all is said and done, both the
new competition and the countervailing power are subject to abuse
just as Adam Smith's concept of individual competition was. No
one knew better than he the strong human tendency for competitors
to do their best to eliminate all but the appearance of competition.
The history of the last twenty years has been the history of
changing conditions which have altered the nature and the field
of economic organization as well as the manner in which the
powers of Government have been exercised. With the progress
of science and technology the economy steadily became less local
and more national in nature, less individual and more corporate,
less amenable to local and more in need of national regulation to
safeguard the public interest. The Sherman Act was nothing more
nor less than the application to national commerce of a rule which
had always applied in local commerce with respect to conspiracies
in restraint of trade. Mr. Lilienthal is altogether right when he
talks about the need of "Big Business for a Big Country," but
certainly he cannot be presumed to contend that conspiracies in
restraint of trade by Big Business operating throughout the
Big Country are less to be feared than were the conspiracies of
smaller businesses in the time of Senator Sherman. These conspiracies are not confined to price fixing alone. They frequently
involve agreements to allocate territory, to control production, to
exclude newcomers to the industry by devious means, indeed, to
resort to one or more of the infinite variety of methods used by
cartels to monopolize or restrain large and even small parts of
trade and commerce. The overall objective of antitrust legislation
has been to suppress such practices and to retain in private hands
the power of decision with Government standing by primarily as
a policeman to prevent abuse.
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There have, of course, been exceptions, as in the fields of communication and aviation where broad grants of discretionary
power have been made to Government commissions. A result of
this has been the open and covert campaigns of private interests
to influence the appointment of the commissioners and thus try
to shape the decisions to be made. This is a well known and
extremely dangerous evil inherent in the grant of discretionary
authority to Government boards.
The exceptions would also include the TVA of which Mr. Lilienthal was a managerial genius and which, at a recent press conference, in response to a correspondent's inquiry, President Eisenhower
cited as an example of "creeping socialism." This characterization of TVA has been repeatedly repudiated by Mr. Lilienthal
and the Tennessee Valley Authority. It prefers to be known as
a democratic achievement through which the people of the Tennessee Valley "have begun to make good use of the new tools provided
for them through the development of Government projects."
TVA has accomplished much good by providing new opportunities for local capital. While a member of the Senate I never
hesitated to support it, for I knew that no private corporation
was capable of making the investment necessary to build it or
willing to give priority to the public interest in its management.
That, however, did not prevent me from saying in the report of
the Temporary National Economic Committee as long ago as 1941
that TVA was an outstanding example of Big Government, carrying within itself the seeds of authoritarianism. In fact, I compared it to the Bituminous Coal Administration, saying in effect
that the former was an example of Government intervention on
behalf of the "have nots" and the latter an intervention of Government on behalf of the "haves," that is to say, the owners of
coal deposits, with incidental benefits to the workers. Both TVA
and the Bituminous Coal Administration acted for but not by
the people most intimately affected by their decisions. Only the
fact that each was in a sense responsible to Congress made them
preferable in a democratic sense to irresponsible private economic
management provided by the characteristic Big Business corporation on the one hand, and the arbitrary management provided
by a totalitarian state on the other.
It is possible to acknowledge everything that Mr. Lilienthal has
said to prove that big industrial organization is essential in our
time, that it has been productive of great benefits to the people
as a whole, that it has not been accompained during the last
twenty years by the degree of concentration feared by Berle and
Means and other analysts about the time of the 1929 depression
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and that it has been accompanied by the development of new
competitive industries. It would also be possible, if space permitted, to document an argument to support the essential truth
of Mir. Galbraith's statement, which Mr. Lilienthal denies, that
"in an established industry where the scale of production is considerable, there is no such thing as freedom of entry." Much
could be written, also, in rebuttal of Mr. Lilienthal's assumption
that criticism of Big Business is primarily based on size alone.
All this, however, is beside the point. There were more billion
dollar corporations in 1952, to be sure, than there were in 1932.
Some which were among the giants two decades ago may have
fallen from that high estate. There are, of course, many more
shareholders now than formerly, but the authority of the small
stockholder is still non-existent. Indeed, the larger the number
of the five and ten share stockholders, the greater the power of
the expert corporate management despite such occasional proxy
battles as that of the New York Central. Big business is still the
"economic state" Woodrow Wilson called it and it is still a threat
to the economic independence of the individual, to say nothing
about political states and local sub-divisions, because it has now
become a "collectivist economic state."
The essential question to be answered, if the system of private
property is to be preserved, is how and in what form public
authority may be exercised over the social action of the organized
industrial society in which we live, without destroying economic
freedom through too much government monopoly or too much
private monopoly. This is really the central issue of our time,
namely, how to make effective the authority of the people as
individuals over the policies of the Big Business organizations
which the modern world requires. Failure to settle this issue with
a democratic formula is the reason why Communist and Fascist
dictatorships dominate so large an area of the world. In selfdefense the free world must produce the formula or the struggle
to escape the authoritarian state will be futile.
It is to be earnestly hoped that the Lilienthal and Galbraith
books will be widely read, for they will be a definite stimulus to
public thinking and thus assist in the formulation of a democratic
rule of order for the establishment and stabilization of a really
free economy.
It is not enough to praise the virtues and efficiency of Big
Business organization. It is not enough to hope that the reaction
of large groups in the economy upon one another will result in
a balance under which all can reasonably struggle along together.
The first alternative would result initially in strengthening the
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power of business management to govern the economy. The latter
would only postpone the inevitable day of decision. The longer
the drafting of a basic economic law is postponed, the greater
the danger will be of a deepening struggle for power over government by pressures from both the right and the left.
Mr. Lilienthal tells us, and I think quite correctly, that "we can
meet both domestic and international demands upon our productive
capacity if we make full use of our talent for large scale organization and administration of industry, research, distribution, credit,
conservation of resources" (pp. 10-11). In this achievement, however, we cannot exclude government, as Mr. Lilienthal himself
clearly recognizes when he asserts that a new "basic economic
law" must be written. Our society has taken so long to write
this law that it now sounds as though it were a new idea. As
long ago as the administration of President Taft, members of
both the legislative and executive branches of the Government
were trying their hands at the job. Senator John Sharp Williams
of Mississippi introduced a bill to license corporations engaged
in interstate commerce. The President himself thought the matter
so important that he had his Attorney General, George Wickersham, draw a bill to provide for the issuance of federal charters
to interstate corporations. Woodrow Wilson, in his campaign of
1912, gave much attention to the problem and after his inauguration became a source of great disappointment to Senator Williams
when he advocated the creation of the Federal Trade Commission
instead of endorsing the Williams bill. Incidentally, by that act,
President Wilson took the step which set the pattern for many
years for boards and commissions with more or less discretionary
power. Curiously enough this idea was not objectionable to Judge
Gary of the United States Steel Corporation, who, at that time,
felt that businesses ought to be able to secure advance approval
from some federal agency for the programs they contemplated
for the expansion of organizations engaged in interstate commerce. President Taft made a notable record of antitrust enforcement, although Theodore Roosevelt was called the "trust buster."
Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt we swung between the
two extremes of so-called "business self-government" from NRA
codes, on the one hand, to the extremely successful antitrust law
enforcement under Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold.
The search for a new law to prescribe the rules for modern
business organization has been a long and puzzling story. We shall
be notably nearer the end of the trail if it is recognized that we
are in search of an economic formula. It is a distinct gain that
Mr. Lilienthal proclaims the importance of this objective (p. 185).
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He himself provides, however, the apt illustrations of how easy
it is to confuse the problem when he criticizes the Sherman Act
as a "double negative" forbidding restraint of trade (p. 185) and
then proposes a "broad declaration of public policy that the prime
concern of Congress is not with competition per se nor with competitors, but with productivity and the promotion of an ethical
and economic distribution of this productivity." There is no
double negative in the Sherman Act, which merely declares that
"every contract . . . in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be
illegal;" that "every person who shall monopolize or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire ... shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor;" and that "every contract, combination in form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is
declared illegal." A new economic law which would transform
these simple declarations of illegality and guilt into affirmations
of legality and innocence of such conspiracies and such restraints
would make it altogether impossible to secure anything remotely
resembling an ethical or economic distribution of the vast productivity of this nation. If it is not the prime concern of Congress
to deal with competition per se or with competitors, as Mr.
Lilienthal says, then certainly we may be permitted to ask, in whom
will the power be reposed to fix the standards of production and
distributioh*in the new economy?
If it is to be placed in the hands of Big Business management
then clearly the power of the Congress, in the words of the Constitution "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several states" will have been seriously curtailed. Indeed, it
will have been transferred to the management of Big Business.
The economy of the country, the system by which the people provide their own livelihood, will have passed from their control to
the control of private managers.
This is the danger of size which Mr. Lilienthal discounts and
the evidence concerning which he ignores. Limitations on productivity to hold prices up, the raising of barriers against new producers, and other predatory practices which are the mark of the
cartel system are much more easily made effective when the
managers of a few big units have the power of decision. It is
only a short step from this to the authoritarian socialist state.
It would be far better to endure continued delay in the formulation of the needed new law and to continue to rely upon the concept
of countervailing economic power until Congress acts.
It must be remembered, however, that Dr. Galbraith frankly
acknowledges (p. 196) that his theory breaks down under inflation. Moreover, it must be clear that the theory affords the
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public no protection against the combination of countervailing
groups unless it be in the antitrust laws. Here it must be pointed
out that the Sherman Act is vastly different from the Clayton
Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. One must realize that the
problem of prices, administered or otherwise, is very different
from conspiracies in restraint of trade. The latter must not be
made legal because it may be desirable to change the former.
It is essential to the preservation of economic freedom that
the individual shall be the source and not the mere subject of the
authority to be exercised over him. Otherwise the principle on
which this nation was founded cannot be preserved. There are
three main goals of a free society: first, freedom for the individual;
second, social justice; third, efficiency and profitability through
the techniques of production and distribution. They are stated
in the order of priority. If that order is reversed, the result is
the subordination of freedom to the power of wealth. All through
history men have preferred the moral values of freedom to the
ease and benefits of efficiency.
The fight against Communism is a fight for these moral values.
It is easy to use stock phrases about the dignity of man and the
freedom of the human soul, but these are all empty words unless
they are alive with the understanding that freedom exists only
in a society in which the individuals themselves make the economic
as well as the political laws to which they must adhere. There is
much evidence that this principle is now far better understood by
the executives of business organization than it was a generation
ago. Surely business, big and little, has a far better understanding
of the social responsibilities of economic organization. We have
had substantial progress during this century. Nevertheless, economic theorizing of all kinds must be subjected to the closest
scrutiny lest we lose sight of the basic fact that what mankind
has been seeking to do in this turbulent century is to make certain
that the collectivist society which research and invention have
produced can be operated according to the democratic-republican
principles upon which this Government was founded.
It is idle to debate the degree of economic concentration or
whether it has fluctuated in the last twenty years. Whatever
these fluctuations may have been, it remains true that less than
one-tenth of all the business firms operating in this country employ
approximately 40 percent of all the workers. Congress may debate
modifications of the Taft-Hartley Act, but all must agree that
it is a law, like the Wagner Act which it amends, to provide for
collective bargaining. It still remains essentially true, as it was
when Berle and Means wrote their book on the modern corpora-
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tion, that the large units of the industrial world are owned by
thousands of small stockholders who exercise only the vaguest
theoretical control over their property. Stockholders and workers
in this country exercise political authority to be sure, but precious
little economic authority. The owners of Big Business delegate
their economic power over their property to employed managers,
while Congress, which long ago began delegating its legislative
power to boards and commissions, is now delegating it to the
executive. The Constitution gave the President veto power over
the acts of Congress, but nowadays Congress, in the various reorganization acts, delegates the legislative authority to the President while retaining only a flimsy veto power over him.
Thus is the very form of democratic government being altered
under the impact of changing economic organization. Dictatorial
governments, whether of the Communist or Fascist variety, are
the products of the ignorance, confusion and uncertainty with
which we have approached the drafting of a new economic Constitution to fit the times in which we live and above all to establish
the standards of conduct, authority, and responsibility for the
corporate economic agencies this era needs to guarantee to all
of the people an expanding share of the benefits large-scale
operations can bring.
Wendell Berge*
Both Big Business: A New Era, written by David E. Lilienthal,
and American Capitalism, The Concept of Countervailing Power,
written by John Kenneth Galbraith, contain provocative discussions
of a basic problem which modern capitalism faces today. The
problem concerns the consequences of the increasing concentration
of economic power, and what, if anything, should be done about it.
Mr. Lilienthal's primary thesis is that in the modern world bigness in business is essential (bigness is printed with a capital "B"
throughout the book), and that we should frankly recognize that
big business provides the means for the greater enrichment of the
lives of the people. The development of technology by big business
has provided greater opportunity, a higher standard of living, and
the means for a better expression of individualism than could have
been possible in a system where only small units were permitted
to exist. Mr. Lilienthal sincerely believes that bigness should be
encouraged by law and public policy. He thinks that present laws
and prevailing attitudes tend to hamstring the true potential of big
*Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
eral of the United States.

Formerly Assistant Attorney Gen-
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business to expand the material and spiritual possibilities of modern life.
At the same time, Mr. Lilienthal recognizes that big business is
not necessarily more efficient than small business, and that big
business may become so large as to jeopardize efficiency and lead to
sterility. He unhesitatingly agrees that the predatory practices of
big business should be checked by governmental action, and in this
area he appears to have no quarrel with the antitrust laws (p. 169).
His concern, rather, seems to be that legal impediments, and the
climate of public opinion, hamper the full realization of the
power of big business to make its most effective contribution to
the nation's welfare.
Dr. Galbraith has written an admirable historical account of the
development of our views and practices concerning competition.
Adam Smith distinguished competition from monopoly by its consequences, saying: "The price of monopoly is upon every occasion
the highest which can be got ...
The price of free competition, on
the contrary, is the lowest which can be taken, not upon every
occasion indeed, but for any considerable time together" (p. 15).
Dr. Galbraith observes that "toward the end of the nineteenth century, writers began to make explicit what had previously been
implied; namely, that competition required that there be a considerable number of sellers in any trade or industry in informed
communication with each other. In more recent times this has been
crystallized into the notion of many sellers doing business with
many buyers" (p. 15). Thus, the thought developed that the price
system, as a self-regulator of business, will fulfill its function only
if no buyer or seller is large enough to control or exercise an appreciable influence on the common price.
But with the tendency toward concentration and the narrowing
of the number of sellers in many important fields of industry, the
concept of competition just noted was, according to Dr. Galbraith,
no longer applicable. Today in many markets there are in fact
only a few sellers, and they are in a position to exercise great power
over the market. Dr. Galbraith then develops his theory of countervailing power whereby the power of big sellers is in a measure
offset by big purchasing and distributing organizations, big labor
and farm organizations, and other dominant groups. Thus, a
measure of balance in the economy is attained (pp. 115-139). Instead of competition among individuals or small businesses, we have
competition among giants.
Both books develop the changing concepts and practices of American business during the last seventy-five years, and also the
evolution that has occurred in the relation of Government to busi-
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ness. Mr. Lilienthal begins by stating that "Big Business" is basic
to the very life of this country, and yet many people have a deepseated fear and emotional repugnance to it. He quite frankly wants
to dispel this fear and repugnance and replace them with fond
admiration. "It is toward a change in our feeling about Bigness
and a resolution of this contradiction that this book is directed," he
states (p. 3). Mr. Lilienthal then spends many pages in developing
his view that modern technology and other factors have revolutionized the economic life of this country so that beliefs which were
valid at the time the Sherman Act was passed have no relevance
today. Only the big corporation can meet the needs of a big country
that has assumed the enormous responsibility of supplying not
only most of its own needs, but those of much of the free world
as well.
According to Mr. Lilienthal, if big business has largely made
price competition obsolete, a new type of competition has replaced
it-the competition between different ways of meeting the same or
a similar need or demand for goods or service (p. 58). Thus, we
have many different products competing because they all supply
essentially the same end need. Examples of this type of competition
would be that of copper and aluminum; also, coal, oil, gas, and
electricity; also, cotton and wool, and many new man-made fibres
(pp. 59-61). Much of this new competition has come about through
the technological development which big business has made possible.
And in Mr. Lilienthal's view, this new competition saves us from
the evils of monopoly. He endeavors to show that under the conditions of the new competition, the policies of Government toward
business, and the everyday enforcement of the antitrust laws, are
based "upon an antiquarian's portrait of another America." Thus,
he concludes that on the whole, trust-busting does not make sense
today because he thinks that, as the antitrust laws are now construed, "the very Bigness upon which we are now dependent may
be illegal" (p. 167).
It is suggested that Mr. Lilienthal's fears about the illegality of
big business as such are quite unwarranted. There has never yet
been an antitrust action seeking dissolution or divestiture based
upon size alone. Indeed, throughout the history of the Sherman Act
there have been relatively few cases instituted which sought dissolution or divestiture. Among those which were successfuly maintained the courts always found that there were present predatory
practices of a sort which Mr. Lilienthal would not condone.
The anxiety which Mr. Lilienthal and others have felt seems to
stem from language in United States v. Aluminum Company of
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America1 and American Tobacco Co. v. United States,2 indicating
that the power to exclude competitors from a market, when accompanied by an intention to exercise such power, constitutes illegal
monopoly (pp. 175-176). Mr. Lilienthal infers that this is a recent
and dangerous trend, but he, like other critics of recent antitrust
decisions, implies that mere power to exclude competitors which
may have been acquired through normal growth and efficiency is
now in the twilight zone of illegality (p. 167).
Careful study of recent court decisions does not bear this out.
Indeed, in the Aluminum case Judge Hand conceded that a single
company might legally possess one hundred per cent control of
manufacture in an industry which could not economically support
more than one factory. Moreover, Mr. Lilienthal, like others who
are currently disturbed, overlooks the fact that in the Aluminum
and Tobacco cases it was held that the intent to exclude other competitors must be present as well as the power. This exonerates the
big businesses whose size results from superior efficiency. Business
which has become big through superior efficiency and the ability
to meet national needs without wilfully excluding competitors has
nothing to fear under the antitrust laws as presently interpreted.
In enforcing the anti-monopoly provisions of the antitrust laws
the Government and the courts are concerned with market dominance, with the power and intent to exclude competitors, rather
than with bigness as such. Much of what Mr. Lilienthal has said
about the efficiency of some of our larger corporations is true. I
have not seen any evidence that the Government is out to destroy
the large private research organizations through antitrust enforcement.
Indeed, many of the recent antitrust suits have been based upon
restrictions on technological development imposed by agreements
among nominally competing corporations. A great deal of evidence
of private restrictions on invention and development has been laid
before Congressional investigating committees. Sometimes the motivation was to preserve investment in existing methods and technologies which would have been rendered obsolete if certain research
had been permitted to go on. Other times it was just not thought
profitable to press the development. Notwithstanding the valuable
contributions of large private research organizations, there is often
not the incentive for a large corporation to encourage particular
research projects, because they may compete with products or processes which the same company already is profitably utilizing. Investigation has shown that a great deal of valuable invention still
1. 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
2. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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stems from the activities of individual inventors or small research
laboratories.
And although Mr. Lilienthal's book throughout extolls the virtues
of bigness, at no place does he undertake to define what constitutes
a big business. Obviously, tests of bigness based on dollar volume
of business, size of investment, percentage of output in relation to
industry, etc., are not in themselves of much significance. Thus,
for example, when Mr. Lilienthal refers to du Pont as having spent
$27,000,000 over a period of years before a bolt of nylon could be
sold (p. 69), he in effect says nothing more than that it takes a
great deal of money to engage in certain lines of research. Obviously, the development of nylon and many other new products
requires a substantial investment of time and money.
But it is difficult to see the relevance of generalization about bigness to the question of whether the antitrust approach is outmoded
and should be changed. Mr. Lilienthal, of course, does not contend
that the antitrust laws hampered the development of nylon nor,
so far as I recall, does he show any evidence that any of the scientific developments of "Big Business" have been interfered with by
antitrust activity. Without a more precise definition of the "Bigness" which he favors, or of the "small business" to which he thinks
our attention has been too much devoted, Mr. Lilienthal's arguments seem to lose much of their force.
If big business is not bad per se, it does not follow that it is good
per se. And, yet, Mr. Lilienthal's enthusiasm for bigness at times
carries the connotation that bigness is good per se. I submit that
big business is neither good nor bad per se, but that any business
must be appraised on the basis of its performance in the public
interest. Thus, I think that Mr. Lilienthal fails to demonstrate any
basic unsoundness in the anti-monopoly provisions of present law.
Dr. Galbraith does not seem to share Mr. Lilienthal's fear that
the very existence of big business is threatened by new interpretations of the antitrust laws. Indeed, he says that "No fundamental
change in the American economy could or is likely to result from
these demands for antitrust enforcement. Thus the businessman
has no reason to be alarmed . . ." (p. 63). And he notes that
American courts have been notably cautious in the remedies that
have been invoked under antitrust laws. "Decrees dissolving existing companies or forcing them to divest themselves of subsidiaries have been exceedingly and increasingly rare." He adds that
"However revolutions are brought about, it is not by litigation"
(p. 58). Thus, Dr. Galbraith is disrespectful of the effectiveness
of the antitrust laws, but since the object of those laws was not
to break up corporations which were performing in the public
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interest, Dr. Galbraith's objection, however intended, does not necessarily mean that the antitrust laws are a failure.
Indeed, many of the large industries in which the number of companies competing with each other has increased in recent years and
in which there has been a deconcentration of economic power are
industries in which there have been frequent antitrust actions.
This is true, for instance, in aluminum, petroleum, electrical
products, and motion pictures, to name only a few. But the suits
in these industries were not aimed at the bigness as such of any
of the company defendants but rather at their misuse of economic
power and their dominance in the industry which actually, or potentially, excluded competitors.
Dr. Galbraith has developed in an interesting manner his theory
of countervailing power in which the power of big consumers, big
unions, big organizations of farmers, and the like, is developed to
offset the concentration of power of the big manufacturers. The
measure of balance in the economy which would result from this
clash of the giants would substitute for older methods of competition as the regulator of our economy. It would also substitute for
government regulation. It seems to follow that only the unorganized would be hurt in this struggle of the powerful; presumably
small business would decline or disappear altogether.
There is not much of an argument to be made against this
approach if the major premise is granted, namely, that monopolistic business is here to stay in the production industries and we
can not do much about it except to build countervailing monopolies
among other groups in the economy.
Admittedly, countervailing power would operate as an effective
restraint on the power of big business only when there is a relative
scarcity of demand. Thus, the market must be of sufficient importance to the seller so that there is some compulsion to comply with
the buyers' demand (p. 136). Dr. Galbraith flatly states that
countervailing power "does not function at all as a restraint on
market power when there is inflation or inflationary pressures on
the market" (p. 133).
Countervailing power also could not operate in a market dominated by a single seller. There must be alternative sources to which
the organized buyers could go. The climate most favorable to the
operation of countervailing power would be a market where there
are sufficient buyers and sellers so that the buyers may play off
sellers against each other, and vice versa. Countervailing power
also could not effectively operate in industries which are integrated
vertically. Dr. Galbraith believes, however, that his theory of
countervailing power "comes to the defense of the antitrust laws
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at what has been a very vulnerable point. Efforts to prevent or
to disperse single-firm control of an industry can be defended for
the greater opening they provide for the exercise of countervailing
power. Similar and equally good reasons exist for resisting mergers. Those who have always believed there was something uniquely
evil about monopoly are at least partly redeemed by the theory of
countervailing power" (p. 151).
Both of these books are well worth reading by those who have an
interest in the developing pattern of business activity in this country and the function of government toward regulating it. I agree
with Senator O'Mahony that neither of these books "presents a
blueprint for action." Nor do I think that either of them presents
an effective case for abolition or drastic revision of the antitrust
laws, although there are a number of ideas advanced by both
authors which are worthy of serious consideration in shaping and
developing our Government's antitrust enforcement policies.

